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Preface
Forord til 3. udgave
Da kurset tidligere var på engelsk og forelæsningsnoterne er på engelsk, er
denne opgavesamling, der bygger på de tidligere kurser, også overvejende på
engelsk. Rettelser og enkelte nye opgaver er tilføjet.
Hermed en tak til sidste års instruktor, stud.polit. Peter Kjær Kruse-
Andersen, for nyttige kommentarer.
August 2014 CG
Preface to the rst edition
This is a collection of exercise problems that have been used in recent years
in the course Macroeconomics 2 within the Mathematics-Economics Bachelor
Program at the University of Copenhagen.
For constructive criticism I thank the instructors Niklas Brønager and
Christian Heebøll-Christensen as well as many previous students who have
su¤ered for bad wording and obscurities in earlier versions of the problems.
No doubt, it is still possible to nd obscurities. Hence, I very much welcome
comments and suggestions of any kind relating to these exercises.
September, 2012 Christian Groth
iii
Remarks on notation
For historical reasons, in some of the exercises the level of technology
(assumed measurable along a single dimension) is denoted A, in others T .
Whether we write lnx or log x; the natural logarithm is understood.
In discrete-time models the time argument of a variable, x; appears always
as a subscript, that is, as xt: In continuous-time models, the time argument
of a variable may appear as a subscript rather than in the more common
form x(t) (this is to save notation).
iv
Chapter A
Technology. Simple long-run
models in discrete time
A.1 Short questions (answering requires only a few well chosen sentences)
a) Consider an economy where all rmstechnology is described by the
same neoclassical production function, Yi = F (Ki; Li); i = 1; 2; :::; N;
with decreasing returns to scale everywhere (standard notation). Sup-
pose there is free entry and exitand perfect competition in all mar-
kets. Then a paradoxical situation arises in that no equilibrium with a
nite number of rms (plants) would exist. Explain.
b) As an alternative to decreasing returns to scale at all output levels,
introductory economics textbooks typically assume that average cost
curve of the rm is decreasing at small levels of production and con-
stant or increasing at larger levels of production. Express what this
assumption means in terms of returns to scale.
c) Give some arguments for the presumption that the average cost curve
is downward-sloping at small output levels.
d) In many macro models the technology is assumed to have constant
returns to scale (CRS) with respect to capital and labor taken together.
What does this mean in formal terms?
e) Often the replication argument is put forward as a reason to expect that
CRS should hold in the real world. What is the replication argument?
Do you nd the replication argument to be a convincing argument for
the assumption of CRS with respect to capital and labor? Why or why
not?
1
2
CHAPTER A. TECHNOLOGY. SIMPLE LONG-RUN MODELS
IN DISCRETE TIME
f) Does the logic of the replication argument, considered as an argument
about a property of technology, depend on the availability of the dif-
ferent inputs.
g) Robert Solow (1956) came up with a subtle replication argument for
CRS w.r.t. the rival inputs at the aggregate level. What is this argu-
ment?
h) Suppose that for a certain historical period there has been something
close to constant returns to scale and perfect competition, but then,
after a shift to new technologies in the di¤erent industries, increasing
returns to scale arise. What is likely to happen to the market form?
Why?
A.2 Consider a rm with the production function Y = AKL; where
A > 0; 0 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1.
a) Is the production function neoclassical?
b) Find the marginal rate of substitution at a given (K;L):
c) Draw in the same diagram three isoquants and draw the expansion
path for the rm, assuming it is cost-minimizing and faces a given
factor price ratio.
d) Check whether the four Inada conditions hold for this function?
e) Suppose that instead of 0 <  < 1 we have   1: Check whether the
function is still neoclassical?
A.3 Consider the production function Y = L+ KL=(K + L); where
 > 0 and  > 0:
a) Does the function imply constant returns to scale?
b) Is the production function neoclassical? Hint: after checking criterion
(a) of the denition of a neoclassical production function in Lecture
Notes, Section 2.1.1, you may apply claim (iii) of Section 2.1.3 together
with your answer to a).
c) Given this production function, is capital an essential production fac-
tor? Is labor?
3d) If we want to extend the domain of denition of the production function
to include (K;L) = (0; 0); how can this be done while maintaining
continuity of the function?
A.4 The Cobb-Douglas production function has the property that un-
der technical progress, it satises all three neutrality criteria if it satises one
of them.True or false? Explain why.
A.5 Stocks versus ows. Two basic elements in long-run models are of-
ten presented in the following way. The aggregate production function is
described by
Yt = F (Kt; Lt; At); (*)
where Yt is output (aggregate value added), Kt capital input, Lt labor input,
and At the level of technology. The time index t may refer to period t, that
is, the time interval [t; t+ 1) ; or to a point in time (the beginning of period
t), depending on the context. And accumulation of the stock of capital in
the economy is described by
Kt+1  Kt = It   Kt; (**)
where  is an (exogenous and constant) rate of (physical) depreciation of
capital, 0    1. Evolution in employment (assuming full employment) is
described by
Lt+1   Lt = nLt; n >  1: (***)
In continuous time models the corresponding equations are: (*) combined
with
_K(t)  dK(t)
dt
= Y (t)  C(t)  K(t);   0;
_L(t)  dL(t)
dt
= nL(t); n free.
a) At the theoretical level, what denominations (dimensions) should be
attached to output, capital input, and labor input in a production
function?
b) What is the denomination (dimension) attached to K in the accumu-
lation equation?
c) Are there any consistency problems in the notation used in (*) vis-à-vis
(**) and in (*) vis-à-vis (***)? Explain.
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d) Suggest an interpretation that ensures that there is no consistency
problem.
e) Suppose there are two countries. They have the same technology, the
same capital stock, the same number of employed workers, and the
same number of man-hours per worker per year. Country a does not
use shift work, but country b uses shift work, that is, two work teams
of the same size and the same number of hours per day. Elaborate the
formula (*) so that it can be applied to both countries.
f) Suppose F is a neoclassical production function with CRS w.r.t. K
and L. Compare the output levels in the two countries. Comment.
g) In continuous time we write aggregate (real) gross saving as S(t) 
Y (t)  C(t): What is the denomination of S(t):
h) In continuous time, does the expression K(t) + S(t) make sense? Why
or why not?
i) In discrete time, how can the expression Kt +St be meaningfully inter-
preted?
A.6 The Solow growth model (cf. Blanchard: Macroeconomics, 3rd ed.,
Ch. 11-12) can be set up in the following way (discrete time version). A
closed economy is considered. There is an aggregate production function,
Yt = F (Kt; TtLt); (1)
where F is a neoclassical production function with CRS, Y is output, K is
capital input, T is the technology level, and L is the labor input. So TL is
e¤ective labor input. It is assumed that
Tt = T0(1 + g)
t; where g  0, (2)
Lt = L0(1 + n)
t; where n  0. (3)
Aggregate gross saving is assumed proportional to gross aggregate income
which, in a closed economy, equals real GDP, Y :
St = sYt; 0 < s < 1: (4)
Capital accumulation is described by
Kt+1 = Kt + St   Kt; where 0 <   1: (5)
The symbols g; n; and s represent parameters and the initial values T0;
L0; and K0; are given (exogenous) positive numbers.
5a) What kind of technical progress is assumed in the model?
b) To get a grasp of the evolution of the economy over time, derive a rst-
order di¤erence equation in the (e¤ective) capital intensity ~k  k=T 
K=(TL); that is, an equation of the form ~kt+1 = '(~kt):
From now on suppose F is Cobb-Douglas.
c) Construct a transition diagramin the (~kt; ~kt+1) plane.
d) Examine whether there exists a unique and asymptotically stable (non-
trivial) steady state.
e) There is another kind of diagram that is sometimes (especially in con-
tinuous time versions of the model) used to illustrate the dynamics
of the economy, namely the Solow diagram. It is based on writ-
ing the di¤erence equation of the model on the form ~kt+1   ~kt =
 (~kt)  a~kt

= [(1 + g)(1 + n)=s] : For the case of the general produc-
tion function (??), nd the function  (~kt) and the constant a: By draw-
ing the graphs of the functions  (~kt) and a~kt in the same diagram, one
gets a Solow diagram: Indicate by arrows the resulting evolution of the
economy.
A.7 We consider the same economy as that described by (1) - (5) in
Problem A.6.
a) Find the long-run growth rate of output per unit of labor, y  Y=L.
b) Suppose the economy is in steady state up to and including period
t   1 such that ~kt 1 =
 
~k > 0 (standard notation). Then, at time t
(the beginning of period t) an upward shift in the saving rate occurs.
Illustrate by a transition diagram the evolution of the economy from
period t onward:
c) Draw the time prole of ln y in the (t; ln y) plane.
d) How, if at all, is the level of y a¤ected by the shift in s?
e) How, if at all, is the growth rate of y a¤ected by the shift in s? Here
you may have to distinguish between temporary and permanent e¤ects.
f) Explain by words the economic mechanisms behind your results in d)
and e).
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g) As Solow once said (in a private correspondence with Amartya Sen1):
The idea [of the model] is to trace full employment paths, no more.
What market form is theoretically capable of generating permanent full
employment?
h) Even if we recognize that the Solow model only attempts to trace hypo-
thetical time paths with full employment (or rather employment corre-
sponding to the naturalor structuralrate of unemployment), the
model has at least one important limitation. What is in your opinion
that limitation?
A.8 A more exible specication of the technology than the Cobb-Douglas
function. Consider the CES production function2
Y = A

K + (1  )L1= ; (*)
where A; ; and  are parameters satisfying A > 0, 0 <  < 1; and  < 1;
 6= 0:
a) Does the production function imply CRS? Why or why not?
b) Show that (*) implies
@Y
@K
= A

Y
K
1 
and
@Y
@L
= (1  )A

Y
L
1 
:
c) Express the marginal rate of substitution of capital for labor in terms
of k  K=L:
d) In case of an a¢ rmative answer to a), derive the intensive form of the
production function.
e) Is the production function neoclassical? Hint: a convenient approach
is to focus on @Y=@K expressed in terms of k and consider the cases
 < 0 and 0 <  < 1; separately; next use a certain symmetry visible
in (*); nally use your answer to a).
1Growth Economics. Selected Readings, edited by Amartya Sen, Penguin Books, Mid-
dlesex, 1970, p. 24.
2CES stands for Constant Elasticity of Substitution. You will meet a CES function
also in Problem A.9, B.8, and B.17.
7f) Draw a graph of y  K=L as a function of k for the cases  < 0 and
0 <  < 1; respectively. Comment and compare with a Cobb-Douglas
function in intensive form, y = Ak.3
g) Write down a CES production function with Harrod-neutral technical
progress.
A.9 A potential source of permanent productivity growth (this exercise
presupposes that f) of Problem A.8 has been solved). Consider a Solow-type
growth model, cf. Problem A.6. Suppose the production function is a CES
function as in (*) of Problem A.8. Let  2 (0; 1); 1=A > (n + )=s; and
ignore technical progress.
a) Express y=k in terms of k; where k  K=L and y  Y=L:
b) For a given k0, illustrate the dynamic evolution of the economy by a
modied Solow diagram, i.e., a diagram with k on the horizontal axis
and sy=k on the vertical axis:
c) Find the asymptotic value of the growth rate of k for t!1: Comment.
d) What is the asymptotic value of the growth rate of y for t!1:
e) The model displays a feature that may seem paradoxical in view of the
absence of technical progress. What is this feature and why is it not
paradoxical after all, given the assumptions of the model?
A.10 In the last four decades China has had very high growth in real
GDP per capita, cf. Table 1. Answer questions a), b), and c) presupposing
that the growth performances of China and the U.S. continue to be like what
they have been 1980-2007.
a) Howmany years does it take for Chinas GDP per capita to be doubled?
You should explain your method.
b) How many years does it take for GDP per capita in the U.S. to be
doubled?
c) How long time, reckoned from 2007, will it take for China to catch up
with the US in terms of income per capita? You should explain your
method.
3This function can in fact be shown to be the limiting case of the CES function (in
reduced form) for  ! 0:
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d) Do you nd it likely that the actual course of events will be (approxi-
mately) like that? Why or why not?
9Table 1. GDP per capita in USA and China 1980 - 2007 (I$ in 2005
Constant Prices)
country year rgdpch
United States 1980 24537.41
United States 2007 42886.92
China 1980 1133.21
China 2007 7868.28
Source: PWT 6.3. Note: For China the Version 2 data series is used.
A.11 An important aspect of macroeconomic analysis is to pose good
questions in the sense of questions that are brief, interesting, and manageable.
If we set aside an hour or so in one of the last lectures at the end of the
semester, what question would you suggest should be discussed?
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Chapter B
Technology. Productivity
growth. Overlapping
generations. Fiscal
sustainability
B.1 Short questions.
a) Make a list of motives for individual saving. Are some of these motives
more in focus in an OLG framework than in a Ramsey framework?
b) Briey give some hints about how you think a Diamond-style OLG
model should be extended to give a more adequate picture of the stan-
dard life-cycle pattern of individual saving?
c) In a two-period OLG model assume that the number of young people,
Lt; grows at the constant rate n. Derive a formula showing the growth
of population Nt  Lt + Lt 1. Comment.
d) Again, in a two-period OLG model assume that the number of young
people, Lt; grows at the constant rate n; but suppose that always half
of the young die just before becoming old. Find the growth rate of the
population. Comment.
e) In standard long-run models with perfect competition (like Diamonds
OLG model or the Ramsey model), the real rate of interest, rt (i.e., a
price on the market for loans), and the real rental rate, ~r, for physical
capital (i.e., a price on the market for capital services) may or may not
coincide for all t. Give a necessary and su¢ cient condition that they
coincide.
11
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B.2 Short questions.
a) What is the golden rule capital intensity?
b) A steady-state capital intensity can be in the dynamically e¢ cient
region or in the dynamically ine¢ cient region. What is meant by
dynamically e¢ cient and dynamically ine¢ cient? Give a simple
characterization of the two regions.
c) Compare some long-run properties of the Ramsey model with the cor-
responding long-run properties of the Diamond OLG model. Hint: For
example, think of the long-run interest rate and/or the possibility of
dynamic ine¢ ciency.
d) The First Welfare Theorem states that, given certain conditions, any
competitive equilibrium ( Walrasian equilibrium) is Pareto optimal.
Give a list of circumstances that each tend to obstruct the needed
conditions and thus make the conclusion untrue.
B.3 A two-period saving problem. Consider the saving problem of the
young in a standard Diamond OLG model (as that in Chapter 3). Let the
utility discount rate be denoted  and let the period utility function be a
CRRA function with parameter ; i.e.,
u (c) =
c1    1
1   ;  > 0:
a) Interpret : Hint: calculate the relative risk aversion,  cu00=u0:
b) Set up the saving problem and nd the saving function of the young.
Comment on the role of the real wage, the rate of return, and :
c) Write down the intertemporal budget constraint with the human wealth
(present discounted value of lifetime labor income) of the young on the
right-hand side.
d) In the (c1; c2) plane (standard notation), illustrate the substitution and
income e¤ects of a rise in r:
We now modify the model and assume the considered individual supplies
inelastically one unit of labor in both periods of life.
e) Set up the saving problem.
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f) Write down the intertemporal budget constraint with the human wealth
of the young on the right-hand side.
g) In the (c1; c2) plane, illustrate the substitution, income, and wealth
e¤ects of a rise in r:
h) As to the wealth e¤ect of a rise in r; compare with the standard Dia-
mond OLG model described in a) - d).
B.4 Social security and the saving of the young. We consider a sim-
ple extension of the Diamond OLG model in order to compare the e¤ects
on aggregate saving and capital accumulation of di¤erent systems of public
pension provision: a funded pension system, i.e., a saving based system (in
Denmark for example the ATP system) and a tax-based system (sometimes
called pay-as-you-go pension system), hence unfunded (in Denmark called
folkepension). These two systems are from now named the funded system
and the tax-based system, respectively. The benchmark case is the standard
Diamond model without any public pension system, here called system 0.
For simplicity, technical progress is ignored.
Let the pension received by an old person in period t+1 be called pt+1 (p
for pension) and let the mandatory (i.e., required by law) contribution of a
young person in period t be called  t ( for tax). Otherwise, the notation
is standard. Then, the pension arrangements are as follows:
funded system: pt+1 = (1 + rt+1) t; (*)
tax-based system: pt+1 = (1 + n) t+1: (**)
Uncertainty and administrative costs are ignored so that the rate of return,
rt+1; in the funded system is the same as that on private saving.
a) What is the relationship between n and the dependency ratio (the
number of retired people as a proportion of the number of people in the
working age population)? Relate the tax-based system to the problems
of nancing social security in the ageing society.
The young, looking ahead, wants to maximize Ut = u(c1t)+(1+) 1u(c2t+1)
subject to two period budget constraints.
b) Write down the two period budget constraints in system 0, the funded
system, and the tax-based system, respectively.
14
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Let the saving of the young individual in period t be called st: Given
kt and the expected rate of return on saving, a temporary equilibrium in
period t; leading to fullment of the expectation, implies that the following
equations hold under system 0:
u0(wt   st) = (1 + ) 1u0((1 + rt+1)st)(1 + rt+1); (1)
wt = f(kt)  ktf 0(kt)  w(kt); (2)
rt+1 = f
0(kt+1)    r(kt+1); (3)
kt+1 =
st
1 + n
(4)
In this system wt; st; rt+1; and kt+1 are endogenous variables.
c) Briey interpret the equations. Describe the causal structure of the
system.
d) Write down the analogue four equations describing equilibrium under
the funded system. Suppose 0 <  t  s0t ; where s0t is the solution for
st under system 0: What is the e¤ect of the funded system on capital
formation compared to system 0? (Give a formal argument as well as
an intuitive explanation.)
e) Set up a similar formal description of equilibrium under the tax-based
system, assuming, for simplicity,  t =  for all t; where  is a positive
parameter.
f) Show that the saving st of the young individual can be written as a
function st = s(wt; rt+1; ) and sign @st=@ : Explain the sign intuitively.
Do you expect this partial equilibrium e¤ect to be the same as the
general equilibrium e¤ect on st of increased ? Why or why not?
B.5 Social security and capital accumulation. In this problem the setup
is the same as in Problem B.4 and it is presupposed that you have solved
that problem.
a) For the case of the tax-based system derive a formula for the general
equilibrium e¤ect of increased  on kt+1; assuming that sr(w(); r(); )
> (1 + n)=f 00() for all relevant (kt; kt+1): Comment on the sign of the
e¤ect. Hint: consider the fundamental di¤erence equation of the model.
b) Suppose the economy is in a stable steady state up to period t0: Then, at
the beginning of period t0,  is increased a little to  0 > : Illustrate the
general equilibrium e¤ect by a phase diagram. Explain the intuition.
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c) Derive the e¤ect of increased  on the steady-state value of k:
d) In addition to the stable steady state assumed to exist, if capital is
essential, there is in a tax-based system with xed  also at least one
unstable steady state below the stable one. Why? Hint: consider
w(kt)   for decreasing kt:
B.6 Discussion of social security reform. To be able to answer this
problem, solving Problem B.4 and B.5 rst may be useful.
In discussions of social security reform, among other things the perspec-
tives a), b), and c) below may be raised. Comment on each of them.
a) Suppose that in order to increase aggregate saving and decrease vulner-
ability to changing n, the government wants to shift societys manda-
tory pension system from a tax-based system to a funded system. Why
is this not a non-problematic thing to do? Hint: there is a hidden
debtto the currently old generation.
b) The distinction between dynamic e¢ ciency and dynamic ine¢ ciency
might have a role to play in the discussion. How?
c) Suppose that in steady state r > n: Then, with a constant mandatory
contribution  (set  t =  t+1 =  in (*) and (**) of Problem B.4),
it seems that a funded system in some sense pays a higher return on
deposits than a tax-based system. How?
d) Can we conclude from this observation that society would gain in e¢ -
ciency by moving from a tax-based system to a funded system? Why
or why not?
B.7 Social security in a small open economy. Change the setup for the
tax-based pension system in a Diamond OLG framework as described in
Exercise B.4 to a small open economy (SOE) setup. Suppose there is perfect
mobility of nancial capital across borders, but no mobility of labor. Suppose
domestic and foreign nancial claims are perfect substitutes. Assume there
is a given positive constant real interest rate, r; in the world market. The
SOE has neoclassical CRS technology and perfect competition in all markets.
There is no government debt.
Let national wealth be denoted Vt: Then Vt  Kt   Ft; where Kt is
aggregate capital andNFDt is net foreign debt of the SOE (all in real terms).
Suppose the mandatory contribution,  t; to the pension system is a positive
constant, i.e.,  t =  > 0.
16
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a) Find the equilibrium real wage: Comment on your solution. Hint: the
competitive rms of the SOE maximize prots facing a given and con-
stant capital cost, r + ; determine the capital intensity they choose.
b) Determine the saving of the young in period t: Comment.
Consider national wealth per worker, vt  Vt=Lt; where Lt is the number
of young people in the SOE.
c) In analogy with the equation (4) of Problem B.4, what is the equation
satised by vt+1? Hint: since by assumption there is no government
debt, national wealth equals private nancial wealth.
d) Derive the general equilibrium e¤ect on vt+1 of increased  : Compare
with the general equilibrium e¤ect on vt+1 in a closed economy, assum-
ing sr > 0:
e) What is the growth rate of Vt and Kt; respectively?
B.8 An economy with backward technology and absence of technology
growth. Suppose the production function in Diamonds OLG model is Y
= A(K + (1   )L)1=; A > 0; 0 <  < 1;  < 0; and A1= < 1 + n.
a) Given k  K=L; nd the equilibrium real wage, w(k): b) Show that
w(k) < (1 +n)k for all k > 0: Hint: consider the roof. c) Comment on the
implication for the long-run evolution of the economy.
B.9 Comparing Diamond and Solow. Set up a Diamond OLG model
with constant population growth rate n  0 and Harrod-neutral technical
progress at a constant rate g > 0: Let the period utility function be u(c) = ln c
and let the production function be Cobb-Douglas.
a) Derive the fundamental di¤erence equation of the model.
b) Will the model generate balanced growth in the long run? Why or why
not?
c) Write down the fundamental di¤erence equation (law of motion) for a
Solow growth model in discrete time with the same production function,
same n and g; a constant saving rate (aggregate saving-income ratio)
 2 (0; 1); and a constant capital depreciation rate  2 [0; 1].
d) Is there a special case where the two models coincide? Why or why
not?
17
e) Let the period length be 30 years. Suppose the Diamond models 
equals 4=3 ( (1 + 0:0286)30   1): Use your empirical knowledge con-
cerning plausible values of  and  (the latter, given a 30 yearsperiod
length): Assess whether one can from the Diamond model come close
to a Solow model.
B.10 Government, income taxes and capital accumulation. Consider a
Diamond OLG model extended with government. Let Gt denote government
spending on goods and services in period t. Assume Gt = G0(1 + n)t, where
G0 is a given positive number and n is the given constant rate of population
growth, n  0. The government uses Gt to provide free public consumer ser-
vices, say free broadcasting services or free exhibitions and museum services.
To nance its purchases, the government levies taxes. To begin, assume
that only labor income is taxed. Let the labor income tax rate be denoted
 t. The government budget is balanced every period. Assume that G0 is
smallenough in relation to K0 and L0 (standard notation) such that for
all t we have 0   t < 1. Let the aggregate production function satisfy the
Inada conditions and ignore technical progress.
a) Assume from now that an individual born at time t has the utility func-
tion U(c1t; c2t+1; Gt; Gt+1) = ln c1t+ lnGt+(1+) 1 [ln c2t+1 +  lnGt+1],
where  is a positive parameter (an indicator of how strongly the public
good is desired). List at least three special features of this two-goods-
two-periods utility function.
b) Derive the saving function of the young.
c) Write down 1) the national accounting equation for the use of output
and 2) the government budget constraint. Find the tax rate  t, given
kt (standard notation). Derive the fundamental di¤erence equation of
the model and illustrate the dynamics in a diagram.
d) Is it true or not true that in the present model, labor income taxes are
similar to lump-sum taxes in their e¤ect on the behavior of the young?
Why?
Let the aggregate production function be Cobb-Douglas.
e) How does the long-run capital intensity depend on the level of G0? A
qualitative answer based on a phase diagram is enough.
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f) Assume that the economy has been in its steady state until period 0.
Then there is an unanticipated change in government tax policy so that
also capital income is taxed, i.e., from period 0 capital income is taxed
at the same proportional rate as labor income, this common rate being
denoted t. The path of government expenditure is unchanged and the
budget is still balanced. Find the new tax rate, t; for t = 0; 1; 2; ::: .
Hint: repeat the steps b) and c) in this new situation.
g) Show that the long-run capital intensity will be higher than with pure
labor income taxation. Explain in words.
h) Assume that the economy has been in its new steady state for a long
time. Then there is an unanticipated change in government tax policy
so that only capital income is taxed, i.e., from now capital income
is taxed at the rate required for a balanced budget, this rate being
denoted ~t. How is the long-run capital intensity a¤ected by this?
B.11 Fiscal sustainability. Consider the government budget in a small
open economy. Time is discrete, the period length is one year, and there is
no uncertainty. Let g and n be non-negative constants and let
Yt = Y0(1 + n)
t(1 + g)t = real GDP,
Gt = real government spending on goods and services,
Tt = real net tax revenue ( = gross tax revenue  transfer payments),
Bt = real public debt at the start of period t;
r = world market real interest rate, a constant.
Assume that any government budget decit is exclusively nanced by issuing
debt (and any budget surplus by redeeming debt).
a) Write down an equation showing how Bt+1 is determined by values of
variables dated t:
Consider a scenario with B0 > 0; 1 + r > (1 + g)(1 + n); and Tt=Yt =  ;
a positive constant less than one:
b) Find the maximum constant G=Y which is consistent with scal sus-
tainability. Hint: the di¤erence equation xt+1 = axt + b; where a and
b are constants, a 6= 1; has the solution xt = (x0   x)at + x; where
x = b=(1  a):
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B.12 Consider a budget decit rule saying that   100 percent of the
interest expenses on public nominal debt, D; plus the primary budget decit
must not be above   100 percent of nominal GDP, PY , where Y is real
GDP, growing at a constant rate, gY > 0; and P is the GDP deator. So the
rule requires that
iDt + Pt(Gt   Tt)  PtYt; (*)
where  > 0;  > 0; and
Gt = real government spending on goods and services in period t;
Tt = real net tax revenue in period t;
i = (1 + r)(1 + )  1; where r is the real interest rate,
 =
Pt   Pt 1
Pt 1
= the ination rate, a given non-negative constant.
a) Is the decit rule of the Stability and Growth Pact in the EMU a special
case of (*)? Comment.
b) Let bt  Dt=(Pt 1Yt): Derive the law of motion (di¤erence equation)
for bt; assuming the decit ceiling is always binding. Hint: GBDt =
iDt + Pt(Gt   Tt):
Suppose  is such that 0 < 1 + (1  )i < (1 + )(1 + gY ):
c) For an arbitrary b0 > 0; nd the time path of b: Briey comment. Hint:
the di¤erence equation xt+1 = axt + c; where a and c are constants,
a 6= 1; has the solution xt = (x0   x)at + x; where x = c=(1  a):
d) How does a rise in  a¤ect the long-run debt-income ratio? Comment.
B.13 A three-period OLG model. Consider an extension of the Diamond
OLG model such that people live for three periods of equal length. For
an individual born at time t, let c1t, c2t+1 and c3t+2 be the consumption
in the rst period of life (youth), the second period of life (middle age
period), and the third period of life (retirement period), respectively.
The utility function of a young born at time t is U(c1t; c2t+1; c3t+2) = ln c1t
+(1 + ) 1 ln c2t+1 +(1 + ) 2 ln c3t+2, where  >  1. Individuals supply
inelastically x units of labor in the rst period of life, one unit of labor in
the second period of life, while people dont work in the third period of life.
The technology side of the model is as in the two-period Diamond model,
people have perfect foresight and all markets are competitive. The rate of
population growth is a constant n >  1:
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a) From now, assume 0 < x < 1. Is this assumption natural? Why or
why not?
b) For notational simplicity, disregard for a moment the time indices t,
t+ 1; and t+ 2. Set up the optimization problem of the young.
c) Derive the intertemporal budget constraint and nd the optimal c1, c2;
and c3: Comment.
d) Find the nancial wealth, a2, held by the middle aged individual at the
beginning of the second period of life and the nancial wealth, a3; of the
old individual at the beginning of the third period of life as functions
of the relevant parameters (a3 = a2 + s2, where s2 is the saving of the
middle aged individual). Do a2 and a3 depend on the rate of return on
saving made in the rst period? Comment in relation to the assumed
logarithmic period utility.
e) Give a list of conditions that could make a2t < 0. Comment!
f) Ignoring technical progress, show that the fundamental di¤erence equa-
tion of the model is a second order non-linear di¤erence equation.
g) If instead of the log function, a general CRRA utility function is used,
the fundamental di¤erence equation would be a third order equation.
Guess why.
B.14 Short- and long-run e¤ects of a technology shock. Consider a Di-
amond OLG model for a closed economy. Let the utility discount rate be
denoted  and let the period utility function be specied as
u (c) =
c1    1
1   ;  > 0:
a) In what sense can even the case  = 1 be interpreted as meaningful?
b) Derive the saving function of the young. Comment.
From now on, assume u(c) = ln c.
c) Let the aggregate production function be a neoclassical production
function with CRS and assume Harrod-neutral (i.e., labor-augmenting)
technical progress at a constant exogenous rate g > 0. Derive the fun-
damental di¤erence equation of the model. Hint: Kt+1 = stLt:
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From now, assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas.
d) Draw a transition diagram illustrating the dynamics of the economy
for a given ~k0 > 0:
e) Is there a unique and asymptotically stable steady state?
f) Are the inferences that can be drawn from the model consistent with
Kaldors stylized facts? Comment.
g) Suppose the economy is in steady state up to and including period
t0   1: Then, at the shift from period t0   1 to period t0; a positive
technology shock occurs such that the technology level, in period t0 is
above 1 + g times that of period t0   1: The rate of technical progress
from period t0 + i to period t0 + i + 1; i = 0; 1; 2;. . . , remains at g;
however, and everyone expects it to do so. Illustrate by a transition
diagram the evolution of the economy from period t0   1 onward:
h) How, if at all, is the real interest rate in the long run a¤ected by the
shock?
i) How, if at all, is the real wage in the long run a¤ected by the shock?
j) How, if at all, is the real wage in period t0 a¤ected by the shock?
B.15 Short- and long-run e¤ects of increased patience in the Diamond
OLG model. Set up a Diamond OLG model with constant population growth
rate n  0 and Harrod-neutral technical progress at a constant rate g > 0:
Let the period utility function be u(c) = (c1  1)=(1  ); where  > 0; and
the production function be Cobb-Douglas.
a) Derive the fundamental di¤erence equation of the model. given the real
wage wt and the real interest rate rt+1.
b) Use your general knowledge about the CRRA-Cobb-Douglas case to
draw a transition diagram illustrating the dynamics of the economy.
Comment on existence, uniqueness, and stability of a steady state of
the economy.
Suppose the economy is in steady state up to and including period t0 1:
Then, at the transition from period t0   1 to period t0 a reduction of the
impatience parameter of the young to a lower level occurs. Henceforth the
impatience parameter remain at the new lower level for every new generation.
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c) Illustrate by a transition diagram how the transition curve is shifted
and how the economy evolves from period t0   1 onward. (Hint: You
may use your intuition but it is better if you can also derive your
conclusion mathematically. With this aim it may be useful to re-write
the steady-state equation such that ~k only appears through the power
function ~k 1:)
d) Let y denote output per unit of labor. In the (t; ln y) plane draw the
time prole of ln y.
e) How, if at all, is the growth rate of y a¤ected by the shift in the impa-
tience parameter? Here you may have to distinguish between tempo-
rary and permanent e¤ects.
f) Explain by words the economic mechanism behind your result in e).
g) What new insight, if any, does the Diamond OLG model add compared
to the Solow growth model?
B.16 A two-period saving problem with CARA utility.1 Consider the
saving problem of the young in a standard Diamond OLG model (as that
in Chapter 3). Let the utility discount rate be denoted  and let the period
utility function be a CARA function with parameter  > 0; i.e.,
u(c) =   1e c:
a) Interpret : Hint: calculate the absolute risk aversion,  u00=u0:
b) Set up the saving problem and nd the saving function of the young.
Comment on the role of the real wage, the rate of return, and :
c) Write down the intertemporal budget constraint with the human wealth
(present discounted value of lifetime labor income) of the young on the
right-hand side.
d) In the (c1; c2) plane (standard notation), illustrate the substitution and
income e¤ects of a rise in r:
We now modify the model and assume the considered individual sup-
plies inelastically one unit of labor in both periods of life.
e) Set up the saving problem.
1Compare with Exercise B.3.
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f) Write down the intertemporal budget constraint with the human wealth
of the young on the right-hand side.
g) In the (c1; c2) plane, illustrate the substitution, income, and wealth
e¤ects of a rise in r: To x ideas your illustration may concentrate on
the case where the parameters are such that the individual in the initial
situation (with the lower r) chooses positive saving in the rst period.
B.17 Consider a Diamond OLG model for a closed economy. Let  be a
parameter,  > 0: Let the period utility function be specied as
u (c) =
(
c1 1=
1 1= ; if  6= 1;
ln c; if  = 1:
a) What is the interpretation of the parameter ?
b) Let the utility discount rate be denoted ;  >  1. Derive the saving
function of the young. In terms of the three Slutsky e¤ects comment
on how a rise in the interest rate a¤ects the saving of the young and
how the net e¤ect depends on the size of .
From now on assume u(c) = ln c.
c) Let the aggregate production function on intensive form be f(~k) =
A(~k + 1   )1=; A > 0; 0 <  < 1;  1 <  < 1: Here ~k 
K=(TL); where K is capital input, L is labor input, and T is the
level of technology, which is assumed to grow at a constant exogenous
rate g > 0. Given that the number of young grows at the rate n;
derive the fundamental di¤erence equation of the model. Hint: with Y
denoting output, f(~k)TL; the marginal productivity of labor is @Y=@L
= (1  )A(~k + 1  )(1 )=T:
It can be shown that lim!0
h
A(~k + 1  )1=
i
= A~k: From now on
assume that f(~k) = A~k:
d) Draw a transition diagram illustrating the dynamics of the economy.
Given ~k0 > 0; indicate how the economy moves over time. Comment.
e) Suppose the economy is in steady state up to and including period
t0   1 > 0: Then, at the beginning of period t0 people become aware
that a slowdown in technical progress has occurred to the e¤ect that
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between period t0+i and period t0+i+1; i = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; the growth rate
of T is at a lower constant level g0 2 (0; g): Everyone rightly expects
the growth rate of T to remain at this lower level forever. Illustrate
by a transition diagram the evolution of the economy from period t0
onward: Comment.
We now add a government sector to the model. The government has
only one activity; the motivation of this activity is that the lowered rate of
technical progress has resulted in an equilibrium path which is dynamically
ine¢ cient.
f) What is meant by dynamically ine¢ cient?
The activity of the government is to issue one-period bonds. A one-period
bond issued at the end of period t   1 (= beginning of period t) pays the
owner a gross return of 1 + rt at the end of period t; where rt is the real
interest rate in the economy. There is no taxation. The budget decit is
nanced by issuing additional debt. Let the real value of the government
debt at the end of period t  1 be denoted Bt:
g) Write down the law of motion (rst-order di¤erence equation) for Bt:
h) Why is it that such a policy may help vis-a-vis dynamic ine¢ ciency?
Hint: Private nancial wealth at the beginning of period t + 1 is now
At+1 = Kt+1 +Bt+1:
i) Suppose the described policy implies convergence to the golden rule
steady state. Will the government then be able to remain solvent?
Why or why not?
B.18 Consider a Diamond OLGmodel for a closed economy. Let the util-
ity discount rate be denoted  and let the period utility function be specied
as u (c) = ln c:
a) Derive the saving function of the young. Comment.
b) Let the aggregate production function be a neoclassical production
function with CRS and assume Harrod-neutral (i.e., labor-augmenting)
technical progress at a constant exogenous rate g > 0. Let Lt denote
the number of young in period t. Derive the fundamental di¤erence
equation of the model.
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From now, assume that the production function is the one given in Prob-
lem A.3, but extended with Harrod-neutral technical progress at the rate
g.
c) Draw a transition diagram illustrating the dynamics of the economy.
Make sure that you draw the diagram so as to exhibit consistency with
the production function.
d) Given the above information, can we be sure that there exists a unique
and globally asymptotically stable steady state? Why or why not?
e) Suppose the economy is in a steady state up to and including period
t0 > 0: Then, at the shift from period t0 to period t0 + 1; a negative
technology shock occurs such that the technology level in period t0 + 1
is below 1 + g times that of period t0: The rate of technical progress
from period t0+i to period t0+i+1; i = 1; 2;. . . , remains at g; however,
and everyone expects it to do so. Illustrate by a transition diagram the
evolution of the economy from period t0 onward: Comment.
f) Let k  K=L: In the (t; ln k) plane, draw a graph of ln kt such that the
qualitative features of the time path of ln k before and after the shock,
including the long run, are exhibited. Hint: k  ~kT:
g) How, if at all, is the real interest rate in the long run a¤ected by the
shock?
h) How, if at all, is the real wage in the long run a¤ected by the shock?
i) How, if at all, is the labor income share of national income in the long
run a¤ected by the shock?
j) Explain by words the economic intuition behind your results in h) and
i).
k) Are the inferences that can be drawn from the model consistent with
Kaldors stylized facts? Comment.
B.19 Consider a Diamond OLG model for a closed economy. Let the
utility discount rate be denoted  and the period utility function be specied
as u (c) = ln c:
a) Derive the saving function of the young. Comment.
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Let the aggregate production function be neoclassical with CRS. Assume
there is Harrod-neutral technical progress at a constant exogenous rate g > 0.
And assume the number, Lt; of young grows at the constant exogenous rate
n >  1:
b) Derive the fundamental di¤erence equation of the model.
c) Assuming capital is not essential and that at least one steady state
exists, draw a transition diagram illustrating the dynamics of the econ-
omy. Given an arbitrary ~k0 > 0 (standard notation), indicate how the
economy moves over time. Hint: limk!0(f(k)  kf 0(k)) = f(0):
d) Given the assumptions made in c), can we be sure about the number of
steady states? Why or why not? Hint: limk!1(w(k)=k) = 0 (standard
notation).
e) List ve of Kaldors stylized facts.
f) For each of these facts check whether the inference that can be drawn
from the model complies with it.
B.20 Consider a small open economy (SOE) facing a constant real inter-
est rate r > 0; given from the world market for nancial capital. We ignore
business cycle uctuations and assume that real GDP, Yt; grows at a constant
exogenous rate gY > 0; we assume gY < r:
Time is discrete. Further notation is:
Gt = real government spending on goods and services,
Tt = real net tax revenue ( = gross tax revenue  transfer payments),
GBDt = real government budget decit,
Bt = real public debt (all short-term) at the start of period t.
Assume that any government budget decit is exclusively nanced by issuing
debt (and any budget surplus by redeeming debt).
a) Write down two equations showing how GBDt and Bt+1; respectively,
are determined by variables indexed by t: Also write down an equation
indicating how Bt+1 is related to GBDt:
Suppose that B0 > 0 and Gt = Yt; t = 0; 1; : : : , where 0 <  < 1: Dene
the net tax burdenas  t  Tt=Yt:
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b) Find the minimum net tax burden,  ; which, if maintained, is consistent
with scal sustainability. Hint: di¤erent approaches are possible; one of
these focuses on the debt-income ratio and uses the fact that a di¤erence
equation xt+1 = axt + b; where a and b are constants, a 6= 1; has the
solution xt = (x0   x)at + x; where x = b=(1  a):
c) How does  depend on r and gY ; respectively? Comment.
B.21 The aggregate saving rate. Consider a Diamond OLG model with
a neoclassical CRS production function F so that aggregate output in period
t is given as Yt = F (Kt; Lt); where Kt is capital input and Lt labor input.
Suppose the model has a unique and asymptotically stable steady state with
capital-labor ratio equal to k > 0:
a) Let SN be aggregate net saving. Derive a formula for the aggregate net
saving rate (SN=Y ) in the long run in terms of the rate of population
growth, the production function on intensive form, and the capital-
labor ratio. Hint: SN = Kt+1  Kt  kt+1Lt+1   ktLt:
b) Assume now that the rate of population growth is zero. What does the
formula tell you about the level of net aggregate saving in steady state
in this case? Give the intuition behind the result.
c) The steady state just described may at rst sight seem paradoxical if
the young are very patient (rate of time preference equal to zero, say).
Is it at all possible that the economy can be in the described steady
state in this situation? Why or why not?
d) Returning to the general case (n >  1), we now extend the model by
adding Harrod-neutral technical progress at the constant rate g > 0:
Derive a formula for the aggregate saving rate in the long run in the
model in this case.
e) In case of zero population growth, is your result from b) still true?
Comment.
f) Empirical cross-country studies generally nd a positive correlation be-
tween the aggregate saving rate and the GDP growth rate. Suggest a
causal interpretation consistent with the present model.
g) Briey suggest a kind of alternative model leading to an opposite in-
terpretation of the causality.
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B.22 As in Exercise B.21, consider a Diamond OLG model. A key rela-
tionship in the model is the equation (standard notation)
Kt+1 = stLt: (*)
a) Explain the equation (*).
b) Is the equation (*) consistent with the national income relationship for
a closed economy, Kt+1 = Kt + St   Kt; where St is aggregate gross
saving and  is the capital depreciation rate? Why or why not?
B.23 Short questions
a) A technically feasible path, f(ct; kt)g1t=0, in a Diamond OLG economy
may be dynamically ine¢ cient. What is meant by this?
b) A given scal policy is sustainable if and only if it maintains com-
pliance with the intertemporal budget constraint of the government.
What is meant by the intertemporal budget constraint of the govern-
mentand is the statement true or false? Briey discuss.
B.24 Consider a small open economy (SOE) facing a real interest rate,
rt; given from the world market for nancial capital. There is no cross-
country mobility of labor. Under normal circumstancesthe following holds:
 aggregate employment, N; is at the full employmentlevel, N = (1 
u)L; where u is the NAIRU and L is the aggregate labor supply, a given
constant;
 real GDP, Yt; equals its given trend level, Yt; which grows at a constant
exogenous rate gY > 0 due to technical progress;
 rt = r; where r is a constant and r > gY .
Time is discrete. Further notation is:
Gt = real government spending on goods and services,
Tt = real net tax revenue = gross tax revenue  transfer payments,
GBDt = real government budget decit,
Bt = real public debt (zero coupon one period bonds) start of period t.
Assume that any government budget decit is exclusively nanced by issuing
debt (and any budget surplus by redeeming debt).
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a) Write down two equations showing how GBDt and Bt+1; respectively,
are determined by variables indexed by t: Also write down an equation
indicating how Bt+1 is related to GBDt:
Suppose that B0 > 0 and Gt =  Yt; t = 0; 1; : : : , where 0 <  < 1: Dene
the net tax burdenas  t  Tt=Yt:
b) Find the minimum constant net tax burden, ^ ; which is consistent
with scal sustainability. Hint: di¤erent approaches are possible; one
focuses on the debt-income ratio and uses the fact that a di¤erence
equation xt+1 = axt + c; where a and c are constants, a 6= 1; has the
solution xt = (x0   x)at + x; where x = c=(1  a):
c) How does ^ depend on r   gY and b0  B0=Y0; respectively?
d) Suppose the government for some reason (economic or political) can
not raise the net tax burden above some threshold value,  ; and can
not decrease the Gt= Yt below some value, : Find the maximum value,
r; of the interest rate consistent with a non-accelerating debt-income
ratio. How does r depend on b0? This dependency tells us why for
some countries a high debt-income ratio is problematic. Explain.
Now consider an alternative scenario. In period t =  1 the SOE is hit by a
huge negative demand shock and gets into a substantial recession (henceforth
denoted a slump) with Y 1 far below Y 1. In response the government decides
an expansionary scal policyinstead of laissez-faire, where:
 laissez-fairemeans maintaining Gt =  Yt, t = 0; 1; : : : ;
 expansionary scal policy entails a discretionary increase in G of
size G; beginning in period 0 and maintained during the slump to
stimulate economic activity, that is, Gt =  Yt + G; where G is a
positive constant:
Let the tax and transfer rules in the economy imply that net tax revenue
in period 0 is given by the function T = T (Y ); thus, T0 = T (Y0): Assume
that under the current slump conditions marginal net tax revenue is T 0(Y )
= 0:50 whereas the spending multiplier is @Y=@G = 1:5:
e) For a given G > 0; nd expressions for the e¤ect of the expansionary
scal policy on GBD0 and B1; respectively, in comparison with laissez-
faire?
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f) For a given r1, and assuming that both @Y=@G and T 0(Y ) are approx-
imately the same in period 1 as in period 0, nd an expression for
the e¤ect of the expansionary scal policy on B2 in comparison with
laissez-faire?
Suppose the slump is over in period 2 and onwards whereby Gt = Yt;
t = 2; 3; : : : . Suppose further that compared with the expansionary scal
policy, laissez-faire during the slump would have implied not only higher
unemployment, but also more people experiencing long-term unemployment.
As a result some workers would have become de-qualied and in e¤ect be
driven out of the e¤ective labor force. Suppose the loss in full employment
output from period 2 and onwards implied by laissez-faire is Y per period;
where Y is a positive constant.2 Finally, let the ensuing loss in net tax
revenue be  Y per period; where  is a positive constant (possibly close
to ^ from b)).
g) With rt = r2; t = 2; 3; : : : , and given G and  , nd an expression for
the value of Y required for the expansionary scal policy to pay for
itselfin period 2 and onwards in the sense that the averted loss in net
tax revenue exactly o¤sets the extra interest payments?
h) Given  = 0:29; r1 = 0:01; and r2 = 0:03; answer again g). Comment.
B.25 Betragt en Diamond OLG model. Kald tidspræferenceraten (nyt-
tediskonteringsraten)  og lad periodenyttefunktionen være speciceret som
u (c) =
c1    1
1   ;  > 0:
a) Kan tilfældet  = 1 fortolkes som meningsfuldt?
b) Udled opsparingsfunktionen for en ung tilhørende generation 0, når
reallønnen i periode 0 er w0 og realrenten (nettoafkastraten i periode 1
på den i periode 0 foretagne opsparing) er r1.
c) Bestem forbruget som ung, c0.
Betragt de to udsagn:
2It is theoretically possible that Y is more or less constant for a long time because
two o¤setting e¤ects are operative. Because of technical progress the loss of output per
lost worker is growing over time. On the other hand the pool of long-term unemployed
generated by the slump will over time be a decreasing share of the labor force due to exit
by the old and entrance by young people in the labor force.
31
(i) En stigning i renteniveauet vil på c0 have en negativ substi-
tutionse¤ekt, en positiv (ren) indkomste¤ekt og en negativ for-
muee¤ekt.
(ii) Når  > 1; vil den totale e¤ekt på c0 af en stigning i
renteniveauet være positiv.
d) Vurdér, om (i) er sand eller falsk, og om (ii) er sand eller falsk. Begrund
din vurdering. Vink: Opskriv den intertemporale budgetrestriktion.
Vi skal nu sammenligne med Ramseymodellen. Med CRRA-nyttefunktion
med parameter  > 0 fører Ramseymodellen til forbrugsfunktionen:
c0 = 0(a0 + h0);
hvor a0 > 0 er en given nansiel formue per capita på tidspunkt 0, og
0 
1R1
0
e
R t
0 (
(1 )r 

+n)ddt
;
h0 
Z 1
0
wte
  R t0 (r n)ddt;
hvor n er befolkningsvækstraten.
e) Betragt igen udsagnene (i) og (ii) og vurdér dem hver for sig ud fra
Ramseymodellen. Vink: Opskriv den intertemporale budgetrestrik-
tion.
B.26 Lad ct være forbrugvareoutput pr. enhed arbejde i periode t, kt
kapital pr. enhed arbejde i periode t og kGR golden rule-kapitalintensiteten.
Betragt udsagnet: I Diamonds OLG-model uden tekniske fremskridt må
et teknisk muligt forløb, fkt; ctg1t=0, med egenskaben kt ! k < kGR; være
dynamisk ine¢ cient.Sandt eller falsk? Kommentér.
B.27 Betragt en økonomi beskrevet ved Diamond OLG model. Kald
tidspræferenceraten (nyttediskonteringsraten)  og lad periodenyttefunktio-
nen være speciceret som
u (c) =
c1    1
1   ;  > 0;  6= 1:
a) Udled opsparingsfunktionen for en ung tilhørende generation t, givet
reallønnen wt og realrenten rt+1.
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Lad Lt være antal unge tilhørende generation t og lad n  0 være
befolkningsvækstraten:Antag at produktionsfunktionen er Cobb-Douglas med
konstant skalaafkast, og at der er Harrod-neutrale tekniske fremskridt med
konstant rate g > 0:
b) Find udtryk for wt og rt+1 i generel ligevægt ud fra henholdsvis ~kt og
~kt+1; hvor ~k er det teknologikorrigerede kapital-arbejdskraft-forhold.
c) Udled den fundamentale di¤erensligning (bevægelseslovenfor økonomien).
Vink: Kt+1 = stLt:
d) Konstruér et transitionsdiagram til illustration af økonomiens udvikling
over tid. Vink: I denne forbindelse er din generelle viden om CRRA-
Cobb-Douglas-tilfældet nyttig.
e) Kanman for arbitrær initialværdi ~k0 > 0 konkludere utvetydigt angående:
(i) eksistens; (ii) entydighed; og (iii) stabilitet af en steady state? Be-
grund dine svar.
Antag økonomien har været i steady state til og med periode t0  1; hvor
t0 > 0: Ved overgangen fra periode t0   1 til periode t0 sker der af en eller
anden grund uventet et skift i de unges tidspræferencerate til et lavere niveau.
Dette nye niveau forbliver gældende i alle perioder fra og med periode t0.
f) Illustrér ved hjælp af det samme eller et nyt transitionsdiagram, hvor-
dan transitions-kurven forskydes, og hvad økonomiens udvikling fra og
med periode t0   1 bliver. Vink: Du kan benytte din intuition, men
det er bedst, hvis du også matematisk kan begrunde din konklusion;
med henblik herpå er det nyttigt at omskrive steady state-ligningen, så
~k kun optræder gennem potensfunktionen ~k 1.
g) Lad y betegne output pr. enhed arbejde. I (t; ln y)-planen tegn for
t  0 tidsprolen for ln y.
h) Hvordan, om overhovedet, påvirkes ys vækstrate af ændringen i tidspræference-
raten? Her kan det være en god idé at sondre imellem det relativt korte
sigt og det lange sigt.
i) Forklar med ord den økonomiske mekanisme bag din konklusion ved
h).
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B.28 Vi ser på en lukket økonomi med o¤entlig sektor. Vi ignorerer kon-
junktursvingninger og antager, at BNI vokser eksogent med en given konstant
rate gY  0; og at realrenten er en given konstant r > gY : Tiden er diskret.
Notationen er:
Gt er den reale o¤entlige udgift til varer og tjenester i periode t,
Xt er den reale o¤entlige udgift til indkomstoverførsler i periode t;
GBDt er det reale o¤entlige budgetunderskud i periode t;
Bt er den reale o¤entlige gæld i starten af periode t:
Antag, at positive (negative) budgetunderskud altid udelukkende nansieres
ved øget (mindsket) o¤entlig gæld, og at al indkomst beskattes med en given
konstant skattesats  2 (0; 1); hvilket giver brutto-skatteprovenuet
~Tt = (Yt +Xt + rBt): (*)
Vi benytter her symbolet ~Tt for at undgå forveksling med nettoskatteprov-
enuet, ~Tt  Xt; der i forelæsningsnoterne som regel er betegnet T:
a) Stil to ligninger op, der viser, hvordan henholdsvis GBDt og Bt+1 er
bestemt af variable dateret t:
Antag at B0 > 0; Gt = Yt; og Xt = Yt; t = 0; 1; 2; : : : , hvor  2 (0; 1)
er given, mens  = (   )=(1   ); uanset hvad  og  er. Er  < ;
er Xt < 0; hvorved  Xt kan fortolkes som provenuet af en yderligere skat
(udover indkomstskatten, fx en lump-sum skat).
b) Bestem fortegnet på budgetunderskuddet i periode t for t = 0; 1; 2; : : : :
c) Bestem udviklingen over tid i gældskvoten, bt; deneret på den gængse
måde som bt  Bt=Yt: Hint: Udled en førsteordens di¤erensligning for
bt og benyt herefter bagudrettet substitution.
d) Hvor stor vil  skulle være for, at eksploderende bt lige akkurat
undgås?
Indtil videre lader vi kriteriet for nanspolitisk holdbarhed være, at bt er
ikke-eksploderende.
e) Antag, at gY = 0: Kan den førte nanspolitik, ( ; ; ); være holdbar?
Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?
f) Antag, at gY > 0: Kan den førte nanspolitik, ( ; ; ); være holdbar?
Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?
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g) Antag nu, at renteindtægter ikke beskattes, så der i stedet for (*) gælder
~Tt = (Yt +Xt);
mens vi stadig har gY > 0: Kan den førte nanspolitik, ( ; ; ); være
holdbar? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke? Kommentér.
Måske er den skattepligtige indkomst et mere relevant indkomstmål i
denne sammenhæng end BNI. Vi lader derfor nu kriteriet for nanspolitisk
holdbarhed være, at t  Bt=(Yt +Xt + rBt) er ikke-eksploderende.
h) Besvar igen e). Kommentér.
Chapter C
Basic representative agent
model in continuous time (the
Ramsey model)
C.1 The saving problem with a CRRA instantaneous utility function.
Consider a household with innite horizon and a CRRA instantaneous utility
function. Facing a constant real interest rate r > 0; the household solves the
problem (standard notation):
max
(ct)
1
t=0
U0 =
Z 1
0
c1 t
1  e
 tdt s.t.
ct  0;
_at = rat + wt   ct; a0 given,
lim
t!1
ate
 rt  0;
where  > 0:
a) Briey, interpret the objective function and the constraints.
b) Derive the rst-order conditions and the Keynes-Ramsey rule. Inter-
pret.
c) Assuming a solution exists, solve the problem, i.e., nd the consump-
tion function. Hint: combine the Keynes-Ramsey rule with strict equal-
ity in the intertemporal budget constraint.
d) Your answer to c) was probably based on a set of necessary rst-order
conditions. Can you be sure they are also su¢ cient? Why or why not?
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e) Does the CRRA utility function satisfy the No Fast Assumption? Why
of why not?
C.2 A positive technology shock. A competitive economy is described by
the two di¤erential equations

~kt = f(~kt)  ~ct   ( + g + n)~kt; ~k0 > 0 given, (*)

~ct =
1

(f 0(~kt)       g)~ct; (**)
and the condition
lim
t!1
~kte
  R t0 (f 0(~ks)  g n)ds = 0: (***)
Notation is: ~kt  Kt=(TtLt) and ~ct  Ct=(TtLt)  ct=Tt; where Kt and
Ct are aggregate capital and aggregate consumption, respectively, and Lt is
population = labor supply, all at time t: Further, Tt is a measure of the tech-
nology level and f is a CRS production function on intensive form, satisfying
f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0; and the Inada conditions. The remaining symbols stand for
parameters and all these are strictly positive. Furthermore,  n > (1  )g.
a) Briey interpret the three above equations, including the parameters.
b) Draw a phase diagram and illustrate the path the economy follows,
given some arbitrary positive initial value of ~k. Can the divergent paths
be ruled out? Why or why not? Is dynamic ine¢ ciency theoretically
possible in this economy? Why or why not?
Assume the economy has been in steady state until time 0: Then an
unanticipated technology shock occurs so that T0 is replaced by T 00 > T0.
After this shock everybody rightly expects T to grow forever at the same
rate as before. We now study short- and long-run e¤ects of this shock.
c) Illustrate by means of the phase diagram what happens to ~k and ~c on
impact, i.e., immediately after the shock, and in the long run.
d) What happens to the real interest rate on impact and in the long run?
e) Why is the sign of the impact e¤ect on the real wage ambiguous (at
the theoretical level) as long as f is not specied further?1
1Remark: for empirically realistic production functions (having elasticity of factor
substitution larger than elasticity of production w.r.t. capital), the impact e¤ect is posi-
tive, however (cf. Chapter 4 of Lecture Notes).
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f) Compare the real wage in the long run to what it would have been
without the shock.
g) Suppose  = 1: Why is the sign of the impact e¤ect on per capita
consumption ambiguous? Hint: c = (  n)(k + h):
h) Compare per capita consumption in the long run with what it would
have been without the shock.
i) It is well-known that the equilibrium path generated by a Diamond
OLG model can be dynamically ine¢ cient. This is because the Dia-
mond model violates one of the conditions needed for the First Welfare
Theorem to hold. What is this condition and does the Ramsey model
satisfy it? Why or why not?
C.3 Aggregate saving, the return to saving. Consider a Ramsey model,
in continuous time, of a closed competitive market economy with public
consumption, transfers, and capital income taxation. The government budget
is always balanced. The model leads to the following di¤erential equations
(standard notation)

~kt = f(~kt)  ~ct   ~   ( + g + n)~kt; ~k0 > 0 given, (*)

~ct =
1

h
(1   r)(f 0(~kt)  )    g
i
~ct; (**)
and the condition
lim
t!1
~kte
  R t0 [(1 r)(f 0(~ks) ) g n]ds = 0: (***)
All parameters are positive and it is assumed that
lim
~k!0
f 0(~k)   > + g
1   r > n+ g > lim~k!1 f
0(~k)  :
The government controls the technology-corrected per capita public con-
sumption ~  Gt=(TtLt); the tax rate  r 2 (0; 1); and the transfers. Until
further notice ~ and  r are kept constant over time and ~ is of moder-
atesize so as to not rule out existence of a steady state. The transfers are
continuously adjusted so that the government budget remains balanced.
a) Briey interpret (*), (**), and (***), including the parameters.
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b) Draw a phase diagram and illustrate the path that the economy follows,
for a given ~k0 > 0. Comment.
c) Is it possible for a steady state to exist without assuming f satises the
Inada conditions? Why or why not?
d) Suppose the economy has been in steady state until time t0: Then,
suddenly  r is changed to a new constant level  0r <  r. The transfers
are immediately adjusted so that the government budget remains bal-
anced. Illustrate by a phase diagram what happens in the short and
long run. Give an economic interpretation of your result.
e) Does the direction of movement of ~k depend on ? Comment.
f) Suppose  = 1: It is well-known that in this case the substitution e¤ect
and the income e¤ect on current consumption of an increase in the
(after-tax) rate of return o¤set each other. Can we from this conclude
that aggregate saving does not change in response to the change in scal
policy? Why or why not? Hint: when  = 1; ct = (   n)(at + ht);
where
ht 
Z 1
t
(ws + xs)e
  R st [(1 r)r n]dds;
here, xs is per capita transfers at time s. Four partial equilibrium
e¤ectsare in play, not only the substitution and income e¤ects.
C.4 Command optimum. Consider a Ramsey setup with CRRA util-
ity and exogenous technical progress at the constant rate g  0. Suppose
resource allocation is not governed by market mechanisms, but by a social
planner, an all-knowing and all-powerful central authority. The social
planner is not constrained by other limitations than those coming from tech-
nical feasibility and can thus ultimately decide on the resource allocation
within these connes.
The decision problem of the social planner is (standard notation):
max
(ct)1t=0
U0 =
Z 1
0
c1 t
1  e
 ( n)tdt s.t.
ct  0;

~kt = f(~kt)  ct
Tt
  ( + g + n)~kt; ~k0 > 0; given,
~kt  0 for all t  0;
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where  + g > 0;    n > (1   )g; and  > 0 (in case  = 1; the expres-
sion c1 =(1  ) should be interpreted as ln c): Assume that the production
function satises the Inada conditions.
a) Briey interpret the problem, including the parameters. Comment on
the inequality   n > (1  )g.
b) Derive a characterization of the solution to the problem and illustrate
by a phase diagram.
c) Compare the solution to the equilibrium path generated by a market
economy described by a Ramsey model with perfect competition and
with the same intertemporal utility function and the same technology
as above. Comment.
d) Can the social planners solution be dynamically ine¢ cient? Why or
why not?
e) Why does the social planner in the present problem not choose a path
converging to the highest possible sustainable path for consumption
per unit of labor?
f) Can the equilibrium path generated by a market economy as described
under c) be dynamically ine¢ cient? Why or why not?
g) Can the equilibrium path generated by a market economy as described
by the Diamond OLG model be dynamically ine¢ cient? Why or why
not?
h) The true answer to f) and g) is not the same. Give an intuitive reason
for this.
C.5 Short questions.
a) Suppose labor income is taxed at the rate w 2 (0; 1): Assume that
the revenue from this income tax is redistributed back to the house-
holds as lump-sum transfers. Consider the assertion: In the Ramsey
model a time-varying labor income tax w will distort the allocation of
resources.True or false? Why?
In the next three questions we consider a Ramsey model with a con-
sumption tax rate  c > 0 such that the household pays (1 +  c)c for the
consumption level c: The government revenue from the tax is used for -
nancing lump-sum transfers to the households.
40
CHAPTER C. BASIC REPRESENTATIVE AGENT MODEL
IN CONTINUOUS TIME (THE RAMSEY MODEL)
b) Let the level of  c be constant over time. Consider the assertion: In
the Ramsey model a constant consumption tax rate will distort the
allocation of resources.True or false? Why?
c) Let the level of  c be constant over time. Suppose someone states the
following: In the described framework, an unanticipated once-for-all
rise in the level of the consumption tax rate leads to lower consumption
in the short run and higher capital intensity in the long run.True or
false? Why?
d) Consider the assertion: In the Ramsey model a time-varying consump-
tion tax rate will distort the allocation of resources. True or false?
Why?
C.6 Short questions. Consider the Ramsey model with CRRA utility
and Harrod-neutral technical progress at rate g:
a) Can a path below the saddle path in (~k; ~c) space be precluded as an
equilibrium path with perfect foresight in the Ramsey model? Why or
why not?
b) Can a path above the saddle path in (~k; ~c) space be precluded as an
equilibrium path with perfect foresight in the Ramsey model? Why or
why not?
c) Answer questions a) and b) now presuming that an equilibrium path
with perfect foresightis replaced by a solution to the social planners
problem.
C.7 Short questions. Consider the optimization problem in C.1.
a) State by words what the No-Ponzi-Game condition says.
b) The No-Ponzi-Game condition belongs to problems with an innite
horizon. What is the analogue constraint for a problem with nite
horizon?
c) State by words what the perfect foresight transversality condition of a
household with innite horizon says.
d) In a standard consumption/saving problem, is the households transver-
sality condition a constraint in the maximization problem or does it
express a property of the solution?
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C.8 Short questions (functional income distribution, stylized facts, rate
of return).
a) If and only if the production function is Cobb-Douglas, does the Ram-
sey model predict that the share of labor income in national income is
constant in the long run.True or false? Give a reason for your answer.
b) Are predictions based on the Ramsey model (with exogenous Harrod-
neutral technical progress) consistent with Kaldors stylized facts? Why
or why not?
c) Suppose we want a concise economic theory giving the long-run level
of the average rate of return in the economy as an explicit or implicit
function of only a few parameters and/or exogenous variables. Does
the Ramsey model give us such a theory? Why or why not?
d) Briey, assess the theory of the long-run rate of return implied by the
Ramsey model. That is, mention what you regard as strengths and
weaknesses of the theory.
C.9 The saving problem with a CARA instantaneous utility function.
Consider a household with innite horizon and a CARA instantaneous utility
function. Facing a constant real interest rate r > 0; the household solves the
problem (standard notation):
max
(ct)
1
t=0
U0 =
Z 1
0
(  1e ct)e tdt s.t.
ct  0;
_at = rat + wt   ct; where a0 is given,
lim
t!1
ate
 rt  0;
where  > 0:
a) Briey, interpret the objective function and the constraints.
b) Derive the rst-order conditions and nd what form the Keynes-Ramsey
rule takes.
c) Solve the problem, i.e., nd the consumption function, presupposing
that r   and initial total wealth, a0+h0 (where h0 is human wealth),
is greater than (r   )=(r2). Hint: combine the Keynes-Ramsey rule
with strict equality in the intertemporal budget constraint.
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d) Your answer to c) was probably based on a set of necessary rst-order
conditions. Can you be sure they are also su¢ cient? Why or why not?
e) Does the CARA utility function satisfy the No Fast assumption? Why
of why not?
C.10 This problem presupposes that you have solved Problem C.3. Con-
sider the model in that problem. Suppose the economy has been in steady
state until time t0: Then the government credibly announces that at time
t1 > t0;  r will be changed to a new constant level  0r <  r. Assume that
people believe in this announcement and that the new taxation policy is im-
plemented as announced. Illustrate by a phase diagram and graphic time
proles of ~c and ~k what happens in the economy for t  t0: Explain.
C.11 A budget decit rule. Let time be continuous and suppose that
money nancing of budget decits never occurs. Consider a budget decit
rule saying that the nominal budget decit must never be above   100 per
cent of nominal GDP, PY;  > 0; that is, the requirement is
_D  PY; (*)
where _D  dD=dt (given D = D(t) is nominal government debt) and P =
P (t) is a price index, whereas Y = Y (t) is real GDP.
a) Is the decit rule in the SGP of the EMU a special case of this? Why
or why not?
b) Suppose the decit rule (*) is always binding for the economy we look
at. Derive the implied long-run value, b; of the debt-income ratio
b  D=(PY ); assuming a non-negative, constant ination rate  (just
a symbol for a constant, not necessarily the mathematical constant
3.14159...) and a positive constant growth rate, gY ; of GDP. Hint: the
di¤erential equation _x + ax = k; where a and k are constants, a 6= 0;
has the solution xt = (x0   x)e at + x; where x = k=a:
c) Let the time unit be one year,  = 0:02; and gY = 0:03 for the SGP of
the EMU: Calculate the value of b: Comment.
C.12 Short questions
a) What is meant by Ricardian equivalence?
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b) What is the basic reason that the Diamond model and the Ramsey
model give opposite conclusions as to the question of Ricardian equiv-
alence?
C.13 Short question
Considering the di¤erent Slutsky e¤ects, the consumption function of
the representative household in a Ramsey model with logarithmic instan-
taneous utility is such that a higher tax on interest income lowers current
consumption.True or false? Why?
C.14 Some quotations.
a) Two economists   one from MIT and one from Chicago   are walking
down the street. The MIT economist sees a 100 dollar note lying on the
sidewalk and says: Oh, look, what a uke!. Dont be silly, obviously
it is false, laughs the Chicago economist, if it wasnt, someone would
have picked it up. Discuss in relation to the theoretical concepts of
arbitrage and equilibrium.
b) A riddle asked by Paul Samuelson (Nobel Prize winner 1970): A physi-
cist, a chemist, and an economist are stranded on an island, with noth-
ing to eat. A can of soup washes ashore. The physicist says let us
smash the can open with a rock. The chemist says let us build a re
and heat the can rst. Guess what the economist says?
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Chapter D
More applications of the
Ramsey model
D.1 E¤ects of a shift to higher patience in the population. Consider a
Ramsey model for a closed economy. The model can be reduced to two
di¤erential equations

~kt = f(~kt)  ~ct   ( + g + n)~kt; ~k0 > 0 given, (*)

~ct =
1

(f 0(~kt)       g)~ct; (**)
and the condition
lim
t!1
~kte
  R t0 (f 0(~ks)  g n)ds = 0: (***)
Notation is: ~kt = Kt=(TtLt) and ~ct = Ct=(TtLt) = ct=Tt; where Kt and
Ct are aggregate capital and aggregate consumption, respectively, and Lt is
population = labor supply, all at time t: Further, Tt is a measure of the
technology level and f is a production function on intensive form, satisfying
f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0; and the Inada conditions. The remaining symbols stand for
parameters and all these are positive. Moreover,   n > (1  )g.
a) Briey interpret the equations (*), (**), and (***), including the para-
meters.
b) Draw a phase diagram and illustrate the path the economy follows,
given some arbitrary positive ~k0. Can the divergent paths be ruled
out? Why or why not?
c) Is dynamic ine¢ ciency theoretically possible in this economy? Why or
why not?
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Assume the economy has been in steady state until time 0: Then for some
external reason an unanticipated downward shift in the impatience parameter
occurs. After this shock everybody rightly expects the impatience parameter
to remain at its new lower level forever. We now study short- and long-run
e¤ects of this shock.
d) Illustrate by means of the phase diagram what happens to the econ-
omy on impact, i.e., immediately after the shock, and in the long run.
Comment.
e) What happens to the real wage on impact and in the long run?
f) What happens to the real interest rate on impact and in the long run?
g) Does the long-run real interest rate depend on n? Why or why not?
h) If instead the economy is described by a Diamond OLG model with
CRRA period utility and Cobb-Douglas production function, what will
the answer to question g) be?
i) Compare your answer to question h) to the result in the Ramsey model.
Comment.
D.2 Consider a Ramsey model, in continuous time, of a closed com-
petitive market economy with public consumption, transfers, and a tax,  ;
on nancial wealth (not interest income). The wealth tax implies that the
households dynamic budget identity in per capita terms reads
_at = (rt      n)at + wt + xt   ct; a0 given, (*)
where at is per capita nancial wealth in the household, rt the real interest
rate, n the population growth rate, wt the real wage, xt a per capita lump-sum
transfer, and ct per capita consumption. The government budget is always
balanced. The model leads to the following di¤erential equations (standard
notation)

~kt = f(~kt)  ~ct   ~   ( + g + n)~kt; ~k0 > 0 given, (**)

~ct =
1

(f 0(~kt)          g)~ct; (***)
and the condition
lim
t!1
~kte
  R t0 (f 0(~ks)   n g)ds = 0: (****)
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Assume that the production function satises the Inada conditions and that
   n > (1   )g: With Gt denoting public consumption, Tt the technology
level, and Lt the size of the labor force (= size of population), we assume
(until further notice) that the government keeps ~  Gt=(TtLt) > 0 as well
as  > 0 constant over time and continuously adjusts the transfers so that
the government budget remains balanced. Moreover, ~ is of moderatesize
relative to the production capacity of the economy so as to not rule out
existence of a steady state. All parameters are nonnegative.
a) Briey interpret (**), (***), and (****), including the parameters.
What would the dynamic budget identity (*) look like if instead of
the tax,  ; on nancial wealth there were a tax,  r; on interest income
(sometimes called capital income)?
b) Draw the phase diagram for the dynamic system (**)-(***) and illus-
trate, for a given ~k0 > 0; the path followed by the economy. Comment.
Can the divergent paths be ruled out as equilibrium paths? Why or
why not?
c) Are the results consistent with Kaldors stylized facts? Comment.
d) What is the welfare e¤ect of the described tax-transfer policy compared
with a policy where all government expenses are nanced by lump-
sum taxes? A brief answer which tells the sign of the welfare e¤ect,
based on a bit of verbal reasoning, is enough. Hint: because the model
has a representative household, we can use the utility integral of the
household as a welfare criterion.
Suppose the economy has been in steady state up until time t0 > 0:
Then, unexpectedly  is changed to a new constant level  0; 0 <  0 < ;
and transfers are adjusted accordingly. Let the government announce that
the new tax-transfer scheme will be adhered to forever and let people rightly
believe this.
e) Illustrate by a phase diagram (possibly a new one) what happens in the
short and the long run, respectively. Give an economic interpretation
of your result.
Assume instead that the change in the tax-transfer policy is introduced
in the following way: it is announced (unexpectedly) at time t0 that the new
tax-transfer policy is to be implemented at time t1 > t0. People believe it
and the new policy with  0 <  is implemented at time t1 as announced.
48
CHAPTER D. MORE APPLICATIONS OF THE RAMSEY
MODEL
f) Indicate in a phase diagram the evolution of the economy for t  0:
Hint: Consider the consumption plan of the forward-looking household
as of time t0. Think about where the economy must be as of time t1: Be
aware that in the time interval [t0; t1) ; the old dynamics in a sense
still hold.
g) By a time prole diagram showing the graphs (t; ~ct) and (t; ~kt), illus-
trate how ~c and ~k evolve over time. Interpret in words what happens.
D.3 Consider a Ramsey model for a closed economy with a public sector.
Let the tax revenue come solely from labor income taxation. The tax revenue
is used by the government to nance a non-rival public service, Gt; as well
as a lump-sum per capita transfer, xt:
The representative household faces the problem (standard notation):
max
(ct)
1
t=0
U0 =
Z 1
0
(
c1 t
1   + v(Gt))e
 ( n)tdt s.t.
ct  0;
_at = (rt   n)at + (1  )wt + xt   ct; a0 given,
lim
t!1
ate
  R t0 (rs n)ds  0;
where  > 0; v0 > 0; and  is a given constant labor income tax rate satisfying
0 <  < 1:
a) Briey, interpret the objective function and the constraints.
b) Derive the rst-order conditions and the implied Keynes-Ramsey rule.
GDP is produced by an aggregate neoclassical CRS production function,
Yt = F (Kt; TtLt);
where Kt and Lt are input of capital and labor, respectively, and Tt is the
exogenous technology level, assumed to grow at the constant rate g > 0: We
assume that
  n > (1  )g:
We further assume that Gt is proportional to the work force measured in ef-
ciency units, that is Gt = ~TtLt; where ~ > 0 is decided by the government.
The transfers are endogenous in the sense of being continuously adjusted so
that the government budget remains balanced, i.e.,
Gt + xtLt = wtLt for all t:
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The model can now be reduced to the following dynamic system

~kt = f(~kt)  ~ct   ~   ( + g + n)~kt; ~k0 > 0 given, (*)

~ct =
1

h
f 0(~kt)       g
i
~ct; (**)
where ~kt  Kt=(TtLt)  kt=Tt, ~ct  ct=Tt; and f is the production function
on intensive form, and where the condition
lim
t!1
~kte
  R t0(f 0(~ks)  n g)ds = 0 (***)
must be satised.
c) Briey interpret (*), (**), and (***).
From now we assume that F satises the Inada conditions and that ~ is
of moderatesize so as to not rule out existence of a steady state.
d) Draw a phase diagram and illustrate the path the economy follows,
given an arbitrary ~k0 > 0. Can the divergent paths be ruled out?
Why or why not? Is dynamic ine¢ ciency theoretically possible in this
economy? Why or why not?
Suppose the economy has been in steady state until time t0 > 0: Then,
unexpectedly, a new spending policy ~0 > ~ is introduced without any change
in  . We assume that the households rightly expect this new policy, (~0; );
to be maintained for all t  t0.
e) Illustrate by the phase diagram (possibly a new one) what happens as
a result of the policy shift.
f) Draw the time prole of ~kt and ~ct for t  0 (the graphs (t; ~kt) and
(t; ~ct)): Give an economic interpretation of your result.
Now suppose instead that the rise in G at time t0 is immediately accom-
panied by a change in the labor income tax rate to a level  0 >  so that the
per capita transfer x need not be changed, at least not at time t0:We assume
that the households rightly expect this policy, (~0;  0); to be maintained for
all t  t0.
g) Illustrate by the phase diagram (possibly a new one) and by time pro-
les of ~kt and ~ct for t  0 what happens as a result of this policy shift.
Comment.
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We now consider still another scenario. At time t0, it is unexpectedly
announced that the new policy, (~0;  0); will be implemented at time t1 > t0:
Suppose people believe in this announcement and that when time t1 arrives,
the new policy is implemented as announced.
h) Illustrate by the phase diagram (possibly a new one) and by time pro-
les of ~kt and ~ct for t  0 what happens as a result of this policy shift.
Comment.
D.4 Betragt en Ramsey model for en lukket økonomi med o¤entlig sek-
tor. Tiden er kontinuert. Der er et o¤entligt forbrug, Gt; lump-sum ind-
komstoverførsler, Xt; samt kapitalindkomstbeskatning med skattesatsen  :
Modellen leder frem til følgende to di¤erentialligninger (standard notation):

~kt = f(~kt)  ~ct   ~   ( + g + n)~kt; ~k0 > 0 given, (*)

~ct =
1

h
(1  )(f 0(~kt)  )    g
i
~ct; (**)
samt betingelsen
lim
t!1
~kte
  R t0 [(1 )(f 0(~ks) ) g n]ds = 0: (***)
Alle parametre er positive, og det antages, at
lim
~k!0
f 0(~k)   > + g
1   > n+ g > lim~k!1 f
0(~k)  :
Regeringen fastsætter skattesatsen  2 (0; 1) og det teknologi-korrigerede
o¤entlige per capita forbrug ~  Gt=(TtLt): Indtil videre er  og ~ konstante;
~ er af moderatstørrelse således, at en steady steady kan eksistere. Lump-
sum per capita indkomstoverførslerne, xt = Xt=Lt; tilpasses kontinuerligt
således, at det o¤entlige budget forbliver balanceret.
a) Giv en kortfattet fortolkning af (*), (**) og (***), inklusiv parametrene.
b) Konstruér et fasediagram og illustrér den bane, økonomien vil følge for
given ~k0 > 0. Kommentér.
c) Behøver vi at forudsætte Inadabetingelserne for at sikre eksistens af en
steady state. Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?
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Antag, at økonomien har været i steady state indtil tidspunkt t0 > 0: På
tidspunkt t0 ændres uventet  til et lavere konstant niveau  0 2 (0; ). Ind-
komstoverførslerne tilpasses med det samme således, at det o¤entlige budget
forbliver balanceret.
d) Husholdningerne forventer (med rette antager vi), at den nye skattesats
vil blive fastholdt for alle t  t0: Illustrér med et fasediagram (eventuelt
et nyt), hvad der sker i tidsintervallet [t0;1) : Giv en økonomisk for-
tolkning.
e) Antag i stedet, at regeringen troværdigt på tidspunkt t0 meddeler, at
skattesænkningen kun vil vare frem til tidspunkt t1 > t0; hvorefter
skattesatsen vil være tilbage på sit gamle niveau i al fremtid. Under
forudsætning af at husholdningerne tror herpå, illustrér med et fasedi-
agram (eventuelt et nyt), hvad der sker i tidsintervallet [t0;1) :
f) På basis af et diagrammed graferne (t; ~ct) og (t; ~kt) illustrér udviklingen
i ~c og ~k i tidsintervallet [0;1) og giv en økonomisk fortolkning.
D.5 Antag, at hvert land i en gruppe af lande (for enkelheds skyld be-
tragtet som lukkede økonomier) nogenlunde dækkende kan beskrives med
Ramseymodellen med CRRA-nyttefunktion og Harrod-neutrale tekniske frem-
skridt. Antag videre, at landene har samme produktionsfunktion, F; samme
initiale teknologiniveau, T0; samme teknologivækstrate, g > 0; samme kapi-
talnedslidningsrate, ; samme tidspræferencerate, ; samme befolkningsvæk-
strate, n; men forskellig grænsenytteelasticitet m.h.t. forbrug, . For hvert
land er samtlige parameterværdier sådan, at et ligevægtsforløb (equilibrium
path) eksisterer. Betragt udsagnet: Modellen forudsiger på dette grundlag,
at forskelle i landenes indkomst pr. indbygger kun vil være midlertidige.
Sandt eller falsk? Kommentér.
D.6 Korte spørgsmål
a) Hvad forstås ved Ricardiansk ækvivalens?
b) Har Diamonds OLG-model egenskaben Ricardiansk ækvivalens? Hvad
er den teoretiske baggrund for, at modellen har/ikke har denne egen-
skab?
c) Har Ramseymodellen egenskaben Ricardiansk ækvivalens? Hvad er den
teoretiske baggrund for, at modellen har/ikke har denne egenskab?
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Chapter E
A carbon tax. The q-theory of
investment
E.1 A carbon tax and Tobins q We consider a small open economy
(henceforth called SOE) with perfect mobility of nancial capital but no mo-
bility of labor. The SOE faces a constant real interest rate r > 0; given from
the world market for nancial capital. The technology of the representative
rm is given by a neoclassical production function with constant returns to
scale,
Yt = F (Kt; Lt;Mt); Fi > 0; Fii < 0 for i = K;L;M:
Here Y is output gross of installation costs, imports, and physical capital
depreciation; K is capital input, and L is labor input, whereas M is an
imported fossil energy source, say oil. We also assume that the three inputs
are direct complements in the sense that
Fij > 0; i 6= j:
The rm faces strictly convex capital installation costs and the installation
cost function is homogeneous of degree one: Jt = G(It; Kt)  Ktg(It=Kt);
g(0) = g0(0) = 0; g00 > 0.
In national accounting what is called Gross Domestic Output (GDP) is
aggregate gross value added, i.e.,
GDPt = Yt   Jt   pMMt; (1)
where pM > 0 is the exogenous real price of oil which we treat as a shift
parameter.
The labor force of the SOE is a constant L: There is perfect competition
in all markets. There is a tax,  > 0; on use of fossil energy (a carbon tax).
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In equilibrium with full employment the following holds:
Mt = M(Kt; (1 + )pM); MK > 0;MpM < 0: (2)
We write the marginal product of capital (Marginal Product of K) as a
function MPK(Kt; (1 + )pM)  FK(Kt; L;M(Kt; (1 + )pM)): It can be
shown that
MPKK < 0;MPKpM < 0: (3)
a) Set up the value maximization problem and derive the rst-order con-
ditions.
b) Given the general information put up, briey explain by words why
GDP takes the form in (1), why the partial derivatives in (2) must have
the shown signs, why we must have MPKpM < 0 as indicated in (3),
and why, at rst glance, the sign of MPKK might seem ambiguous.1
The dynamics of the capital stock is given by
_Kt = (m(qt)  )Kt; K0 > 0 given, (4)
where m(1) = 0; m0 = 1=g00; and  is the capital depreciation rate whereas
q is the shadow price of installed capital along the optimal path, satisfying
the di¤erential equation
_qt = (r + )qt  MPK(Kt; (1 + )pM) + g(m(qt)) m(qt)(qt   1): (5)
Moreover, a necessary transversality condition is
lim
t!1
Ktqte
 rt = 0:
c) Briey interpret (4) and (5): what is the economic storybehind these
equations?
d) Assuming F satises the Inada conditions, construct a phase diagram
for the system (4) - (5). Hint: it can be shown that at least in a neigh-
borhood of the steady state, the slope of the _q = 0 locus is negative.2
e) For an arbitrary K0 > 0; indicate in the diagram the evolution of
the pair (Kt; qt) in general equilibrium. Does the convergent solution
path satisfy the transversality condition? Is the solution to the model
unique? Hint: it can be shown that the divergent solution paths violate
the transversality condition.
1You do not have to explain why nevertheless MPKK < 0 since it takes some steps to
prove this. A proof is given in the appendix to Chapter 15 of the lecture notes.
2Indeed, the proof in Appendix E to Chapter 14 of the lecture notes is also valid here.
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f) Assume that until time t0 > 0; the economy has been in its steady
state. Then, unexpectedly the government raises the carbon tax to
 0 > : Illustrate graphically what happens on impact and gradually
over time. Comment on the e¤ect of the tax rise on investment.
g) Illustrate in another gure the time proles of Kt and qt for t  0:
Briey explain in words.
h) We now go a little outside the present simple model. Suppose, that a
non-fossil energy source is available whose application requires a lot of
specially designed capital equipment. Although before the tax rise this
alternative technology has not been privately cost-e¢ cient, after the tax
rise it is. Moreover, the representative rm expects internal positive
learning-by-doing e¤ects by adopting the alternative technology. Do
you think it is possible that the rise in the carbon tax could in this
broader setup a¤ect capital investment in an opposite direction to what
you found in e)? Why or why not?
E.2 In this exercise we consider an economy as described in Exercise E.1,
ignoring its last question. Assume
G(I;K) =
1
2

I2
K
;  > 0:
Assume further that until time t0 > 0; the economy has been in its steady
state with carbon tax equal to  : Then, unexpectedly the government raises
the carbon tax to  0 >  at the same time as it introduces an investment
subsidy ; 0 <  < 1; so that to attain an investment level I; purchasing the
investment goods involves a cost of (1 )I: The subsidy is nanced by some
tax not a¤ecting rmsbehavior (for example a constant tax on households
consumption).
a) Given  0, nd the required  in terms of MPK(K; (1 +  0)pM) such
that the economy stays with its oldsteady-state capital stock, K:
Comment.
b) How, if at all, is the steady-state value of q a¤ected by the change in
scal policy?
E.3 Consider a single rm with production function
Yt = F (Kt; Lt);
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where Yt; Kt; and Lt are output, capital input, and labor input per time unit
at time t, respectively, while F is a neoclassical production function with
CRS and satisfying the Inada conditions. Time is continuous. The increase
per time unit in the rms capital stock is given by
_Kt = It   Kt;  > 0;
where It is gross investment per time unit at time t and  is the capital
depreciation rate. There is perfect competition in all markets and there is
no uncertainty. The real interest rate faced by the rm is a positive constant
r. Cash ow (in real terms) at time t is
Rt = F (Kt; Lt)  wtLt   It  G(It);
where wt is the real wage and G(It) is a capital installation cost function
satisfying
G(0) = G0(0) = 0; G00(I) > 0:
(An example is G(I) = (=2)I2;  > 0:)
a) Set up the rms intertemporal production and investment problem
as a standard optimal control problem, given that the rm wants to
maximize its market value. Let the adjoint variable be denoted qt:
b) Derive the rst-order conditions and state the necessary transversality
condition, TVC. Hint: the TVC has the standard form for an innite
horizon optimal control problem with discounting.
c) What is the economic interpretation of qt?
d) Show that the optimal labor input is such that the capital-labor ratio
at time t is an increasing function of wt. Hint: it is convenient to
consider the production function on intensive form.
Suppose from now that wt = w for all t  0; where w is a positive
constant. Let the corresponding optimal capital-labor ratio be denoted k:
e) The optimal investment level, It; can be written as an implicit function
of q: Show this. Construct a phase diagram for the (K; q) dynamics,
assuming that a steady state with K > 0 exists. Let the steady state
value of K be denoted K. Hint: since the capital installation cost
function is simpler than usual, the phase diagram may look somewhat
di¤erent from the usual one.
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f) For an arbitrary K0 > 0; indicate in the diagram the movement of the
pair (Kt; qt) along the optimal path. In another diagram draw the time
proles of qt; It; and Kt: Comment on why, in spite of the marginal
productivity of capital in the steady state exceeding r + ; there is no
incentive to increase K above K:
g) It is common to callK the desired capital stock. Express the desired
capital stock as an implicit function of r; ; and k: How does the desired
capital stock depend on r and w; respectively? Indicating the sign is
enough. Hint: a simple approach can be based on curve shifting.
h) Show that optimal net investment, Int  It   Kt; equals (K  Kt):
In the obtained net investment rule you should recognize a principle
from introductory macroeconomics. What is the name of this principle?
Comment.
i) Let F be Cobb-Douglas with CRS and let G(I) = (=2)I2;  > 0: Find
q; I; and K along the optimal path. Hint: the di¤erential equation
_x(t)+ax(t) = b with a 6= 0 has the solution x(t) = (x(0) x)e at+x,
where x = b=a:
E.4 Tobins q and imperfect competition. Consider a single rm supplying
a di¤erentiated good in the amount yt per time unit at time t: The production
function is
yt = K

t L
1 
t ; 0 <  < 1; (*)
where Kt and Lt are capital and labor input at time t; respectively.
The nominal wage and the nominal general price level in the economy
faced by the rm are constant over time and exogenous to the rm. So the
real wage is an exogenous positive constant, w. The demand, yd, for the
rms output is perceived by the rm as given by
yd = p "
Y
n
; " > 1; (**)
where p is the price set in advance by the rm (as a markup on expected
marginal cost), relative to the general price level in the economy, n is the
given large number of monopolistically competitive rms in the economy,
Y is the overall level of demand, and " is the (absolute) price elasticity
of demand. The interpretation is that the rm faces a downward sloping
demand curve the position of which is given by the general level of demand,
which is exogenous to the rm. We assume that within the time horizon
58
CHAPTER E. A CARBON TAX. THE Q-THEORY
OF INVESTMENT
relevant for the analysis, Y is constant and the rm keeps p xed, possibly
due to menu costs. Moreover, the analysis will ignore uncertainty.
The increase per time unit in the rms capital stock is given by
_Kt = It   Kt;  > 0; K0 > 0 given,
where It is gross investment per time unit at time t and  is the capital
depreciation rate. We assume that p is high enough to always be above
actual marginal cost so that it always pays the rm to satisfy demand. Then
cash ow at time t is
Rt = py
d   wLt   It  G(It);
where G(It) is a capital installation cost function satisfying
G(0) = G0(0) = 0; G00(I) > 0:
a) To obtain yt = yd; a certain employment level is needed. Find this
employment level as a function ofKt and yd: Let your result be denoted
L(Kt; y
d):
The real interest rate faced by the rm is denoted r and is, until further
notice, a positive constant. As seen from time 0, the rm solves the following
decision problem:
max
(It)1t=0
V0 =
Z 1
0

pyd   wL(Kt; yd)  It  G(It)

e rtdt s.t.
It free (i.e., no restriction on It);
_Kt = It   Kt; K0 > 0 given,
Kt  0 for all t:
b) Briey interpret this decision problem.
c) Denoting the adjoint variable q; derive the rst-order conditions and
state the necessary transversality condition (TVC) for a solution. Hint:
the TVC has the standard form for an innite horizon optimal control
problem with discounting.
d) The optimal investment level, It; can be written as an implicit function
of qt: Show this.
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e) Construct a phase diagram for the (K; q) dynamics, assuming that a
steady state with K > 0 exists. Let the steady state value of K be
denoted K. For an arbitrary K0 > 0; indicate in the diagram the
movement of the pair (Kt; qt) along the optimal path.
Assume that until time t1; the economy has been in steady state. Then,
unexpectedly, the aggregate demand level, and thereby yd; shifts to a new
constant level yd0 < yd and is rightly expected to remain at that level for a
long time.
f) Illustrate by the same or a new phase diagram what happens on impact
and gradually over time. Comment on the implied e¤ect on investment
on impact and in the long run.
Assume instead that it is the interest rate which at time t1 shifts to a
new constant level r0 > r and is rightly expected to remain at that level for
a long time.
g) Illustrate by the same or a new phase diagram what happens on impact
and gradually over time. Comment on the implied e¤ect on investment
on impact and in the long run.
h) As a modied scenario, imagine that the fall in demand at time t1
considered under f) was in fact due to a rise in the interest rate at time
t1: Compare the implied combined e¤ect on investment on impact and
in the long run with the isolated e¤ects under f) and g), respectively.
i) Relate the results in f) and g) to the signs of the partial derivatives of
the investment function in a standard IS-LM model. Comment.
E.5 Consider a single rm with production function
Yt = K

t (TtLt)
1 ; 0 <  < 1;
where Yt; Kt; and Lt are output, capital input, and labor input per time unit
at time t, respectively. Time is continuous and Tt is the technology level,
growing over time at a constant rate  > 0. The increase per time unit in
the rms capital stock is given by
_Kt = It   Kt; K0 > 0;  > 0;
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where It is gross investment per time unit at time t and  is the capital
depreciation rate. Cash ow (in real terms) at time t is
Rt = K

t (TtLt)
1    Jt   wtLt   It;
where wt is the real wage and Jt represents capital installation costs given
by
Jt = 
I2t
2Kt
:
There is perfect competition in all markets and no uncertainty. The real
interest rate faced by the rm is a constant r > 0.
a) Set up the rms intertemporal production and investment problem
as a standard optimal control problem, given that the rm wants to
maximize its market value.
Let the adjoint variable be denoted qt:
b) Derive the rst-order conditions and state the necessary transversality
condition (TVC). Hint: along the optimal plan the partial derivative of
the current-value Hamiltonian w.r.t. the state variable equals the dif-
ference between the discount rate multiplied by the adjoint variable and
the time derivative of the adjoint variable; the TVC has the standard
form for an innite horizon optimal control problem with discounting.
c) What is the economic interpretation of qt? On the basis of one of the
rst-order conditions, express the optimal investment level at time t as
a function of qt and Kt:
From now on, assume that the rm is a representative rm in a small
open economy.
d) Suppose the government wants to stimulate rmsinvestment and from
time t0 on implements a subsidy ; 0 <  < 1; so that to attain an
investment level I; purchasing the investment goods involves a cost of
(1   )I: Assuming the subsidy is nanced by some tax not a¤ecting
rmsbehavior (for example a tax on householdsconsumption), will
the government attain its goal? Make sure that you substantiate your
answer by a formal proof.
Dene ~kt  Kt=(TtLt) and assume that labor supply grows at the constant
rate n  0:
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e) Show that

~kt = (aqt   b)~kt; where a and b are constants:
f) On the basis of another of the rst-order conditions from question b),
derive an equation for _qt in terms of qt and ~kt:
g) Suppose r >  + n: Draw a phase diagram in the (~k; q) plane and
illustrate the evolution of the economy for t  0, assuming that 0 <
~k0 < ~k
; where ~k is the steady-state value of ~k: Hint: it can be shown
that in a neighborhood of the steady state, the _q = 0 locus is negatively
sloped.
E.6 Consider a small open economy facing a constant real interest rate,
given from the world market. Markets are competitive. Labor supply is
inelastic and constant over time and there is no technical progress. The
government contemplates introduction of an investment subsidy, ; such
that to buy I machines, each with a price equal to one unit of account,
rms have to pay (1   )I units of account, where  is a constant, 0 <
 < 1. The private sector is in a steady state and is not aware of these
governmental considerations. In this setting, Tobins q-theory of investment
predicts that by introducing and maintaining the investment subsidy , the
government will be able to stimulate aggregate net investment temporarily,
but not permanently.True or false? Why?
E.7 Short question.
In a standard Ramsey model and a model based on the q-theory of in-
vestment the circumstances under which rms optimize are di¤erent. Give a
brief characterization of this di¤erence and its implications.
E.8 Short question.
In many simple macroeconomic models a rms acquisition of its capital
input is described as if the rm solves a sequence of static prot maximiza-
tion problems. One can imagine circumstances where this description of
rmsbehavior is not adequate, however. Give a brief account of what such
circumstances might be and what alternative approach might be relevant.
E.9 Betragt en enkelt virksomhed, der står over for beslutningsprob-
lemet: vælg en plan (Lt; It)1t=0; der maksimerer
V0 =
Z 1
0
(F (Kt; Lt) G(It; Kt)  wtLt   (1  )It) e rtdt u.b. (1)
Lt  0; It fri (dvs. ingen restriktion på It); (2)
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_Kt = It   Kt; K0 > 0 given, (3)
Kt  0 for alle t: (4)
Her er F en neoklassisk produktionsfunktion med konstant skalaafkast og
opfyldende Inada-betingelserne. Input af kapital og arbejde betegnes hen-
holdsvis Kt og Lt; G er en funktion, der bestemmer kapitalinstallering-
somkostningerne, It er bruttoinvesteringer, wt er en given realløn, r > 0
er en given konstant realrente, og  > 0 er en given konstant kapitalnedslid-
ningsrate. Der er et konstant investeringssubsidium  2 (0; 1): Installering-
somkostningsfunktionen G opfylder
G(0; K) = 0; GI(0; K) = 0; GII(I;K) > 0; og GK(I;K)  0;
for alle (I;K):
a) Opstil løbende-værdi-Hamiltonfunktionen. Lad den til K knyttede
hjælpevariabel (adjoint variable) være betegnet qt: Udled førsteordens-
betingelserne og angiv den nødvendige transversalitetsbetingelse. Vink:
I dette problem har den nødvendige transversalitetsbetingelse standard-
formen ved et optimal-kontrol-problem med diskontering og uendelig
tidshorisont.
b) Fortolk qt: Vis at det optimale investeringsomfang til tidspunkt t er en
funktion af qt; Kt og :
Fra nu af ser vi på tilfældet G(I;K) =  I
2
2K
; hvor  > 0:
c) Udtryk det optimale It=Kt som en funktion af qt og :
Antag at den betragtede virksomhed er den repræsentative virksomhed
i en lille åben økonomi med fuldkommen konkurrence og fri bevægelighed
af nansiel kapital, men ingen bevægelighed af arbejdskraft på tværs af
grænserne. Arbejdsstyrken i den lille åbne økonomi er en konstant, L.
d) Vis at virksomhedens førsteordensbetingelser kombineret med fuld be-
tigelse resulterer i to sammenhørende di¤erentialligninger i Kt og qt:
e) Konstruér det tilhørende fasediagram og vis i diagrammet (Kt; qt)s
udvikling over tid for arbitrær initialværdi K0 > 0: Kommentér.
f) Antag at indtil tidspunkt t0 > 0 har systemet været i steady state med
(K; q) = (K; q). Så hæver regeringen uventet investeringssubsidiet
til niveauet 0 > . Antag at investeringssubsidiet med rette forventes
at forblive på det nye niveau i al fremtid. Illustrér ved hjælp af det
samme eller et nyt fasediagram den bane, som (Kt; qt) følger for t > t0:
Kommentér.
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g) Betragt udsagnet: Stigningen i investeringssubsidiet har en midler-
tidig virkning på bruttoinvesteringerne, ikke en permanent.Sandt eller
falsk? Hvorfor?
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CHAPTER E. A CARBON TAX. THE Q-THEORY
OF INVESTMENT
Chapter F
Uncertainty, expectations, and
speculative bubbles
F.1 Suppose that Yt = Xt + et, where fXtg is a random walk and et is
white noise.
a) Calculate the rational expectation of Xt and Yt conditional on all rele-
vant information up to and including period t  1?
b) Compare the rational expectation of Yt with the subjective expectation
of Yt based on the adaptive expectations formula with adjustment speed
equal to one.
c) Compare the rational expectation of Xt with the subjective expecta-
tion of Xt based on the adaptive expectations formula with adjustment
speed equal to one.
F.2 Consider a simple Keynesian model of a closed economy with con-
stant wages and prices (behind the scene), abundant capacity, and output
determined by demand:
Yt = Dt = Ct + I +Gt; (1)
Ct =  + Y
e
t 1;t;  > 0; 0 <  < 1; (2)
Gt = (1  ) G+ Gt 1 + "t; G > 0; 0 <  < 1; (3)
where the endogenous variables are Yt = output (= income), Dt = aggregate
demand, Ct = consumption, and Y et 1;t = expected output (income) in period
t as seen from period t  1; while Gt, which stands for government spending
on goods and services, is considered exogenous as is "t, which is white noise.
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Finally, investment, I, and the parameters ; ; ; and G are given positive
constants.
Suppose expectations are static in the sense that expected income in
period t equals actual income in the previous period.
a) Solve for Yt.
b) Find the income multiplier (partial derivative of Yt) with respect to a
change in Gt 1 and "t; respectively:
Suppose instead that expectations are rational.
c) Explain what this means.
d) Solve for Yt:
e) Find the income multiplier with respect to a change in Gt 1 and "t;
respectively.
f) Compare the result under e) with that under b). Comment.
Consider a simple Keynesian model of a closed economy with constant
wages and prices (behind the scene), abundant capacity, and output deter-
mined by demand:
Yt = Ct + It; (1)
Ct = a+ bY
e
t 1;t; a > 0; 0 < b < 1; (2)
It = It + "t; It > 0; (3)
where the endogenous variables are Yt = output (= income), Ct = consump-
tion, It = investment, and Y et 1;t = expected output in period t as seen from
period t   1: The variable "t is white noise. To simplify, It is exogenous
(predetermined) and known by the public in advance.
Suppose expectations are static in the sense that expected income in
period t equals actual income in the previous period.
a) Solve for Yt.
b) Find the income multiplier with respect to a change in It and "t;
respectively:
Suppose instead that expectations are rational.
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c) Explain what this means.
d) Solve for Yt:
e) Find the income multiplier with respect to a change in It and "t; re-
spectively.
f) Compare the result under e) with that under b). Comment.
Let us now compare the aggregate consumption function in this simple
short-run model with the aggregate consumption function in the Ramsey
model with logarithmic instantaneous utility.
g) Write down the latter consumption function.
h) Comment on di¤erences between this and (2).
i) Although (2) is too simple, could there be a good reason for letting the
role of expected output in period t enter in a short-run model as it does
here? Comment.
F.3 Consider arbitrage between equity shares and a riskless asset paying
the constant rate of return r > 0. Let pt denote the price at the beginning of
period t of a share that at the end of period t yields the dividend dt. As seen
from period t there is uncertainty about pt+i and dt+i for i = 1; 2;. . . . That
is, Etdt = dt; Etdt+i = dt+i + ut+i; where ut+i is a random variable. Suppose
agents have rational expectations and care only about expected return (risk
neutrality).
a) Write down the no-arbitrage condition.
Suppose dividends follow the process dt = d + "t; where d is a positive
constant and "t is white noise, observable in period t; but not known in
advance.
b) Find the fundamental solution for pt and let it be denoted pt . Hint:
given yt = aEtyt+1 + c xt; the fundamental solution is yt = cxt +
c
P1
i=1 a
iEtxt+i:
Suppose someone claims that the share price follows the process
pt = p

t + bt;
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with a given b0 > 0 and, for t = 0; 1; 2;. . . ,
bt+1 =

1+r
qt
bt with probability qt;
0 with probability 1  qt;
where qt = f(bt); f 0 < 0:
c) What is an asset price bubble and what is a rational asset price bubble?
d) Can the described bt process be a rational asset price bubble? Hint:
a bubble component associated with the inhomogenous equation yt
= aEtyt+1 + c xt is a solution, di¤erent from zero, to the homogeneous
equation, yt = aEtyt+1.
F.4 Short question
Under the hypothesis of rational expectations, speculative bubbles can-
not arise in general equilibrium.True or false? Why?
F.5 The housing market in an old city quarter (partial equilibrium analy-
sis) Consider the housing market in an old city quarter with unique amenity
value (for convenience we will speak of housesalthough perhaps apart-
mentswould t real world situations better). Let H be the aggregate stock
of houses (apartments), measured in terms of some basic unit (a house of
normal size, somehow adjusted for quality) existing at a given point in
time. No new construction is allowed, but repair and maintenance is re-
quired by law and so H is constant through time. Notation:
pt = the real price of a house (stock) at the start of period t;
m = real maintenance costs of a house (assumed constant over time);
~Rt = the real rental rate, i.e., the price of housing services (ow),
Rt = ~Rt  m = the net rental rate = net revenue to the owner per unit
of housing services.
Let the housing services in period t be called St: Note that St is a ow: so
and so many square meter-months are at the disposal for utilization (accom-
modation) for the owner or tenant during period t: We assume the rate of
utilization of the house stock is constant over time. By choosing appropriate
measurement units the rate of utilization is normalized to 1, and so St = 1H.
The prices pt; m; and Rt are measured in real terms, that is, deated by the
consumer price index. We assume perfect competition in both the market
for houses and the market for housing services.
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Suppose the aggregate demand for housing services in period t is
D( ~Rt; Xt); D1 < 0; D2 > 0; (*)
where the stochastic variableXt reects factors that in our partial equilibrium
framework are exogenous (for example present value of expected future labor
income in the region).
a) Set up an equation expressing equilibrium in the market for housing
services. In a diagram in (H; ~R) space, for given Xt; illustrate how ~Rt
is determined.
b) Show that the equilibrium net rental rate at time t can be expressed as
an implicit function of H; Xt; and m; written Rt = R(H;Xt;m): Sign
the partial derivatives w.r.t. H and m of this function. Comment.
Suppose a constant tax rate R 2 [0; 1) is applied to rental income, after
allowance for maintenance costs. In case of an owner-occupied house the
owner still has to pay the tax RRt out of the imputed income, Rt; per house
per year. Assume further there is a constant property tax rate  p  0 applied
to the market value of houses. Finally, suppose a constant tax rate  r 2 [0; 1)
applies to interest income, whether positive or negative. We assume capital
gains are not taxed and we ignore all complications arising from the fact that
most countries have tax systems based on nominal income rather than real
income. In a low-ination world this limitation may not be serious.
We assume housing services are valued independently of whether the oc-
cupant owns or rents. We further assume that the market participants are
risk-neutral and that transaction costs can be ignored. Then in equilibrium,
(1  R)Rt    ppt + pet+1   pt
pt
= (1   r)r; (**)
where pet+1 denotes the expected house price next period as seen from period
t, and r is the real interest rate in the loan market. We assume that r > 0
and all tax rates are constant over time.
c) Interpret (**).
Assume from now that the market participants have rational expectations
(and know the stochastic process which Rt follows as a consequence of the
process of Xt).
d) Derive the expectational di¤erence equation in pt implied by (**).
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e) Find the fundamental value of a house, assuming Rt does not grow too
fast. Hint: write (**) on the standard form for an expectational dif-
ference equation and use that the fundamental solution of the standard
equation yt = aEtyt+1 + c xt is yt = cxt + c
P1
i=1 a
iEtxt+i:
Denote the fundamental value pt : Assume Rt follows the process
Rt = R + "t; (***)
where R is a positive constant and "t is white noise with variance 2.
f) Find pt under these conditions.
g) How does Et 1pt (the conditional expectation one period beforehand
of pt ) depend on each of the three tax rates? Comment.
h) How does V art 1(pt ) (the conditional variance one period beforehand
of pt ) depend on each of the three tax rates? Comment.
F.6 A housing market with bubbles (partial equilibrium analysis) We
consider the same setup as in Exercise F.5, including the equations (*), (**),
and (***).
Suppose that until period 0 the houses were owned by the municipality.
But in period 0 the houses are sold to the public at market prices. Suppose
that by coincidence a large positive realization of "0 occurs and that this
triggers a stochastic bubble of the form
bt+1 = [1 +  p + (1   r)r] bt + "t+1; t = 0; 1; 2; :::; (1)
where Et"t+1 = 0 and b0 = "0 > 0:
Until further notice we assume b0 is large enough relative to the stochastic
process f"tg to make the probability that bt+1 becomes non-positive negligi-
ble.
a) Can (1) be a rational bubble? You should answer this in two ways: 1)
by using a short argument based on theoretical knowledge, and 2) by
directly testing whether the price path pt = pt + bt is arbitrage free.
Comment.
b) Determine the value of the bubble in period t, assuming "t i known for
i = 0; 1; :::; t.
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c) Determine the market price, pt; and the conditional expectation Etpt+1.
Both results will reect a kind of overreactionof the market price to
the shock "t. In what sense?
d) It may be argued that a stochastic bubble of the described ever-lasting
kind does not seem plausible. What kind of arguments could be used
to support this view?
e) Still assuming b0 > 0; construct a rational bubble which has a constant
probability of bursting in each period t = 1; 2; ::::
f) What is the expected further duration of the bubble as seen from any
period t = 0; 1; 2; :::; given bt > 0? Hint:
P1
i=0 iq
i(1  q) = q=(1  q):1
g) If the bubble is alive in period t; what is the probability that the bubble
is still alive in period t+ s; where s = 1; 2; :::? What is the limit of this
probability for s!1?
h) Assess this last bubble model.
i) Housing prices are generally considered to be a good indicator of the
turning points in business cycles in the sense that house prices tend
to move in advance of aggregate economic activity, in the same di-
rection. In the language of business cycle analysts housing prices are
a procyclical leading indicator. Do you think this last bubble model
ts this observation? Hint: consider how a rise in p a¤ects residential
investment and how this is likely to a¤ect the economy as a whole.
1Here is a proof of this formula.
P1
i=0 iq
i(1   q) = (1   q)qP1i=0 iqi 1 = (1  
q)q
P1
i=0 dq
i=dq = (1 q)qd  P1i=0 qi =dq = (1 q)qd (1  q) 1 =dq = (1 q)q (1  q) 2 =
q (1  q) 1 : 
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Appendix A. Solutions to linear
di¤erential equations
For a general di¤erential equation of rst order, _x(t) = '(x(t); t); with
x(t0) = xt0 and where ' is a continuous function, we have, at least for t
in an interval ( ";+") for some " > 0;
x(t) = xt0 +
Z t
t0
'(x(); )d : (*)
To get a conrmation, calculate _x(t) from (*).
For the special case of a linear di¤erential equation of rst order, _x(t) +
a(t)x(t) = b(t); we can specify the solution. Three sub-cases of rising com-
plexity are:
1. _x(t) + ax(t) = b; with a 6= 0 and initial condition x(t0) = xt0 : Solution:
x(t) = (xt0   x)e a(t t0) + x; where x =
b
a
:
If a = 0; we get, directly from (*), the solution x(t) = xt0 + bt:
2
2. _x(t) + ax(t) = b(t); with initial condition x(t0) = xt0 : Solution:
x(t) = xt0e
 a(t t0) + e a(t t0)
Z t
t0
b(s)ea(s t0)ds:
2Some non-linear di¤erential equations can be transformed into this simple case. For
simplicity let t0 = 0: Consider the equation _y(t) = y(t) ; y0 > 0 given,  6= 0;  6= 1
(a Bernoulli equation). To nd the solution for y(t); let x(t)  y(t)1  : Then, _x(t)
= (1   )y(t)  _y(t) = (1   )y(t) y(t) = (1   ): The solution for this is x(t)
= x0 + (1   )t; where x0 = y1 0 : Thereby the solution for y(t) is y(t) = x(t)1=(1 )
=

y1 0 + (1  )t
1=(1 )
; which is dened for t >  y1 0 =((1  ):
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Special case: b(t) = ceht; with h 6=  a and initial condition x(t0) = xt0 :
Solution:
x(t) = xt0e
 a(t t0) + e a(t t0)c
Z t
t0
e(a+h)(s t0)ds
= (xt0  
c
a+ h
)e a(t t0) +
c
a+ h
eh(t t0):
3. _x(t) + a(t)x(t) = b(t); with initial condition x(t0) = xt0 : Solution:
x(t) = xt0e
  R tt0 a()d + e  R tt0 a()d
Z t
t0
b(s)e
R s
t0
a()d
ds:
Special case: b(t) = 0: Solution:
x(t) = xt0e
  R tt0 a()d :
Even more special case: b(t) = 0 and a(t) = a; a constant. Solution:
x(t) = xt0e
 a(t t0):
Remark 1 For t0 = 0; most of the formulas will look simpler.
Remark 2 To check whether a suggested solution is a solution, calculate
the time derivative of the suggested solution and add an arbitrary constant.
By appropriate adjustment of the constant, the nal result should be a repli-
cation of the original di¤erential equation together with its initial condition.
